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Articles
The Psychology of Secret Settlements
GILAT JULI BACHAR†
The #MeToo movement called attention to the use of non-disclosure clauses in settlement
agreements as a tool to silence victims of sexual wrongdoing by repeat offenders such as
movie mogul Harvey Weinstein and Olympic gymnast doctor Larry Nassar. The exposure of
such secret settlements prompted a fierce policy and scholarly debate on the legitimacy and
desirability of NDAs. Though the risk of NDAs hindering accountability is hardly new, NDAs
are now increasingly the subject of legislative action, in states ranging from California and
New York to Nevada and Tennessee. But should all NDAs be banned or limited by sunshinein-litigation laws? And will such legislation adequately reflect the public’s attitudes
regarding what it wishes (and doesn’t wish) to know? Existing legal scholarship on the
regulation of sexual harassment NDAs fails to benefit from the theoretical wisdom and
empirical methods which psychological research can offer regarding these questions.
This Article is the first to empirically identify psychological factors affecting lay attitudes
towards secret settlements. Using a survey experiment conducted with a large representative
sample, it brings to light the mechanisms underlying the public’s tendency to seek information
or remain in the dark regarding sexual harassment. The findings suggest that, counter to
existing psychological theories, lay people actually prefer public disclosure of arguably the
most uncomfortable information. Furthermore, according to the findings, the severity of the
wrongdoer’s misconduct and the victim’s financial status each have an independent negative
effect on lay people’s endorsement of NDAs.
These empirical findings will allow legislatures to regulate secret settlements in a manner
that appropriately embodies the scope of the public’s right to know. Such regulation will in
turn help preserve both employees’ willingness to come forward about sexual harassment and
employers’ inclination to settle. Moreover, these findings should encourage victim advocates
to explore ways to maintain disadvantaged victims’ bargaining power under a confidentiality
ban regime. Prudent advocacy would help ensure that the choice between settlement and trial
remains available to financially unstable victims. The findings further show the potential

† J.S.D. ‘18, Stanford Law School; Visiting Assistant Professor, Villanova University Charles Widger
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promise of bipartisan collaboration over sunshine-in-litigation laws, at least when it comes
to severe acts of sexual harassment.
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INTRODUCTION: #METOO AND SECRET SETTLEMENTS
The #MeToo hashtag began to spread virally on social media with the
exposure of sexual misconduct by repeat offender Harvey Weinstein, the
Hollywood mega-producer that more than eighty women brought sexual
misconduct allegations against and was subsequently convicted and jailed.1 But
many other public scandals fueled the movement. These include, for instance,
the uncovering of repeated sexual assault crimes perpetrated by Dr. Larry
Nassar, former USA Gymnastics national team doctor and Michigan State
physician, and sexual misconduct allegations brought by twenty-three women
against the late Roger Ailes, former Fox News chairman and CEO. Other
examples abound.2
Aside from bringing the issue of sexual wrongdoing to the fore, these three
cases—like many others—share another important feature: the use of
nondisclosure agreements as part of claim settlement agreements (“NDAs” or
“secret settlements”). That is, victims in the context of all three cases have
agreed to confidentiality in exchange for monetary compensation. In 2016, Fox
News host Gretchen Carlson got a reported $20 million settlement after she sued,
claiming Roger Ailes demoted and then fired her when she rejected his sexual
advances.3 As part of the settlement, Carlson signed an NDA that bars her
entirely from discussing what happened to her at Fox News. She has since been
vocal in her attempts to get out of that agreement.4 In December 2016, McKayla
Maroney, a gold medal winning gymnast, agreed to resolve her lawsuit against
USAG for enabling Nassar to abuse her. In the settlement agreement, Maroney
promised to either refrain from further speech about her ordeal or pay a more

1. To me, as to others before me, “sexual misconduct” encompasses behaviors ranging from sexual assault
to verbal harassment unrelated to the offender’s sexual desires. See David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann,
Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 167–68 (2019).
2. See generally Sarah Almukhtar, Michael Gold & Larry Buchanan, After Weinstein: 71 Men Accused
of Sexual Misconduct and Their Fall from Power, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2017/11/10/us/men-accused-sexual-misconduct-weinstein.html (discussing the aftermath of Harvey
Weinstein’s firing, including a list of men who were fired or otherwise suffered consequences as of 2018).
3. The scandal was portrayed in the 2019 film “Bombshell.” BOMBSHELL (Lionsgate 2019).
4. Clare Duffy, Gretchen Carlson Fights Back Against Nondisclosure Agreements Like the One She
Signed with Fox News, CNN: BUS. (Dec. 15, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/15/media/
gretchen-carlson-fox-news-nda-reliable-sources/index.html. Carlson has founded, along with fellow former Fox
News colleagues Julie Roginsky and Diana Falzone, the nonprofit organization “Lift Our Voices” to advocate
for an end to NDAs that prohibit people who have been sexually harassed at work from speaking about it. See
LIFT OUR VOICES: NEWSROOM, https://www.liftourvoices.org/in-the-news (last visited Jan. 3, 2022). Fox News
was recently sanctioned by the New York City Commission on Human Rights for its conduct in the context of
sexual harassment complaints. See David Bauder, Fox News Fined $1 Million Following Sexual Harassment
and Retaliation Investigation, HUFFPOST: POLS. (June 30, 2021, 4:44 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/
fox-news-fined-1-million_n_60dc2a7be4b0d3e35f9ac4ec.
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than $100,000 liquidated damages fee,5 plus the costs of enforcement.6 In
October 2017, Zelda Perkins, the longtime assistant to Weinstein, broke a
nineteen-year-old agreement in which she agreed not to reveal that Weinstein
had harassed her in return for £250,000.7 Perkins’s unveiling sparked a swell of
stories by other victims of Weinstein, and, along with his resignation and the
firm’s bankruptcy, intensified the #MeToo movement.
Indeed, the #MeToo movement made salient the use of non-disclosure
clauses in workplace sexual harassment settlements as a tool to silence victims.8
When some victims breached their NDAs—exposing multiple instances of
abuse—a fierce policy and scholarly debate ensued on the legitimacy and
desirability of secret settlements. Though the risk of NDAs hindering
accountability in other contexts is hardly new,9 secret settlements of sexual
harassment claims are now increasingly the subject of legislative action, with
states ranging from New York and New Jersey to Tennessee and Nevada
adopting various measures to combat the phenomenon.10 Taking the most
5. Victor Mather, McKayla Maroney Says USA Gymnastics Forced Confidentiality in Sexual Abuse
Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/sports/olympics/mckaylamaroney-usa-gymnastics-confidentiality-agreement.html.
6. Complaint for Damages at 53–54, Maroney v. Mich. State Univ., No. BC-687396 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec.
20, 2017). Revelation of this stipulation eventually led USAG to abandon it. Heather Tucker, USA Gymnastics
Says it Will Not Fine McKayla Maroney if She Speaks Out Against Larry Nassar, USA TODAY (Jan. 16, 2018,
10:40 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2018/01/16/usagymnastics-mckayla-maroneylarry-nassar/1039025001.
7. Matthew Garrahan, Harvey Weinstein: How Lawyers Kept a Lid on Sexual Harassment Claims, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/1dc8a8ae-b7e0-11e7-8c12-5661783e5589.
8. NDAs ‘Should Not Silence Sexual Harassment Claims,’ BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2020)
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51438851 (quoting Acas chief executive Susan Clews, explaining that
NDAs can be used legitimately but that they should not be used routinely to silence employees from reporting
harassment). Indeed, sexual harassment can be defined in different ways. Employment discrimination scholars
adopt a power-based account of sexual harassment (which considers “harassment as an expression of workplace
sexism, not sexuality or sexual desire”). See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again,
128 YALE L. J. F. 22, 24 (2018); Vicki Schultz, Essay, Open Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment
Discrimination Law Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 18–19 (2018). On the other hand, the commonplace
use of the term “sexual harassment” refers only to sexual advances motivated by desire. See Sexual Harassment,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003) (“uninvited and unwelcome verbal or physical behavior of a
sexual nature especially by a person in authority toward a subordinate (such as an employee or student)”). To
the extent that these definitions do not coincide in the context of this piece, I borrow from the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which defined sexual harassment as: “unwelcome or offensive
conduct based on a protected characteristic under employment anti-discrimination law.” CHAI R. FELDBLUM &
VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 3 (2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/select-task-force-study-harassment-workplace.
9. See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 932
(2006) (criticizing secret settlements in the context of labor discrimination cases and suggesting policy
solutions); Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements,
105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 873 (2007) (economically analyzing confidential settlements and concluding that given
competing effects it is difficult to predict the net result of a confidentiality ban); Richard A. Zitrin, The Case
Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 115, 119
(1999) (arguing against secret settlements in a variety of tort-related cases, including defective products).
10. See generally ANDREA JOHNSON, RAMYA SEKARAN & SASHA GOMBAR, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR.,
2020 PROGRESS UPDATE: METOO WORKPLACE REFORMS IN THE STATES (2020), https://nwlc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/v1_2020_nwlc2020States_Report-MM-edits-11.11.pdf [hereinafter NWLC REPORT]
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aggressive stand against NDAs, a recent California statute effectively made it
unlawful for an employer to require an NDA in sexual harassment and related
claims.11
Should sexual harassment NDAs be completely banned, limited, or left
entirely to the parties? To what extent should such sunshine-in-litigation laws
(“sunshine laws”) embody not only the public’s right to know, but also what the
public wishes to know? While the practice of NDAs raises legal, ethical, social,
and public policy questions, existing legal scholarship has so far analyzed these
questions through a theoretical or economic prism,12 and has failed to embrace
the wisdom and empirical methods of psychology.13 This Article aims to begin
closing this gap by assessing the effect of two factors theorized to drive lay
people’s moral judgments regarding secret settlements. It embarks on a series of
experimental studies that will help policymakers better understand and regulate
secret settlements. Such regulation will, in turn, improve the prospects of
maintaining both employees’ willingness to come forward about sexual
harassment and employers’ inclination to settle such complaints.
This Article is the first to examine psychological factors affecting lay
attitudes towards secret settlements. In so doing, it provides a sorely missed
empirical foundation to current policy and scholarly debates. By adopting an
interdisciplinary perspective, this Article makes two important contributions.
First, it enriches the theoretical literature on secret settlements, by drawing a
connection between the public’s right to know as lauded in legal scholarship
based on the assumption that certain information will generate more benefits
than costs, and the public’s potential desire to remain in the dark about
uncomfortable information as identified in psychological literature. Second, it
has an immediate real-world impact, ensuring that policymakers are informed
about factors that affect public attitudes regarding secret settlements in
workplace sexual harassment, and can consequently design more effective
policy.
On the theory front, this Article pushes beyond the silo of current literature
on secret settlements. To do so, it uses theories drawn from the realm of social
psychology, and behavioral law and economics to form hypotheses about lay

(surveying state laws in the post-#MeToo era). For a relatively recent review of such laws in the context of
workplace sexual misconduct claims, see generally Mushu Huang, Legislative Responses to the Use of NonDisclosure Agreement Regarding Workplace Sexual Misconduct Claims: From Information Transparency to
Systematic Protection, 1 SETON HALL L. SCH. STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 1023 (2019), https://scholarship.shu.edu/
student_scholarship/1023.
11. Stand Together Against Non-Disclosure Act, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001 (West 2018).
12. See, e.g., Kotkin, supra note 9, at 948; Zitrin, supra note 9, at 123 (both analyzing the implications of
secret settlements from a legal and ethical perspective).
13. However, more work has been done on lay perceptions of settlement more generally. For example,
recent work reveals that “[d]espite common models of settlement as a cost-benefit analysis not necessarily tied
to responsibility, lay people attribute responsibility to settling defendants.” See Jessica Bregant, Jennifer K.
Robbennolt & Verity Winship, Perceptions of Settlement, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at
1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3868526.
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people’s desire to know or remain in the dark regarding sexual harassment. To
the extent that theories such as taboo tradeoffs and deliberate ignorance apply
here,14 what are their implications for the public’s attitudes regarding NDAs?
Since uncomfortable tradeoffs—like exchanging money for physical or
emotional injury—are difficult for lay people to stomach, I expected that lay
people will prefer to keep such exchanges under wraps, even at the cost of
limiting accountability for sexual misconduct. Yet, as detailed below, the
findings show that lay people actually prefer public disclosure of what might be
considered the most uncomfortable information: severe sexual misconduct. In
this sense, this Article helps crystalize the relationship between the public’s right
to know about incidents of sexual harassment on the one hand, and the public’s
delimitation of its desire to know on the other, opening the door for future
research to determine the underlying mechanisms driving this desire.15
As for policy, this Article offers guidance to policymakers seeking to
successfully regulate secret settlements and minimize attempts to bypass such
regulation. The rise of the #MeToo movement has focused public attention on
the problem of sexual harassment like never before. Yet, to achieve social
change successfully and responsibly, policy should not be based on hunches and
media soundbites; rather, it should draw on rigorous social science research.
People’s beliefs about fairness and justice are the core antecedent of the
willingness to cooperate voluntarily and stand behind laws and policies.16
Therefore, lay attitudes towards legal issues matter if we aspire to change
behavior through regulation, thus reducing the need to monitor regulated
players.17 First, data about lay attitudes will provide evidence regarding political
will and the scope of the intervention needed. Given the binary interest group
politics which characterizes the debate on NDAs, with the plaintiffs’ bar and
corporations supporting them and feminist groups rejecting them, data on lay
attitudes can help nuance the discourse and encourage policymakers to adopt
14. See Part III, infra (for detailed explanation of theories). Briefly, the combination of insights from these
theories suggests that people may prefer to remain in the dark regarding uncomfortable tradeoffs such as
exchanging money for misconduct.
15. Indeed, as detailed below, these findings may reflect people’s taste for titillating gossip regardless of
the public interest.
16. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115,
121–22 (1999); see also Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws
28 (Stan. L. Econ. Olin Working Paper, Paper No. 466, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2443427 (showing that
laws that are in strong conflict with prevailing social norms may backfire, while gradual tightening of laws can
be more effective in influencing social norms and behavior); Clifton B. Parker, Laws May Be Ineffective if They
Don’t Reflect Social Norms, Stanford Scholar Says, STAN. NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014), https://news.stanford.edu/
news/2014/november/social-norms-jackson-112414.html (arguing that while laws that conflict with norms are
likely to go unenforced, laws that influence behavior can change norms over time).
17. See generally Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral
Change, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman
eds., 2014). Indeed, one salient example is the laws against smoking in the U.S. Id. at 250–53. As in that context,
identifying lay people’s moral intuitions can help design policy that either adequately reflects these sentiments
or, if necessary, seeks to override intuitions by engaging reason. See Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Darley,
Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice, 40 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 193, 218 (2008).
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balanced regulation in this area. Second, since even the most carefully drafted
confidentiality bans might be prone to manipulations and loophole-seeking by
reluctant parties, public buy-in is crucial. To ensure such buy-in, we first need
data assessing the public’s current attitudes regarding NDAs. Based on the
findings of this Article, policymakers will be able to better design partial or
blanket confidentiality bans, pass the needed legislation, and ultimately increase
the impact such bans will have on the public’s behavior.
To embark on this endeavor, this Article employs a survey experiment
administered to a nationally representative sample.18 The experiment tests the
effect of two independent variables on lay people’s approval of secret
settlements in the context of sexual harassment: the severity of the wrongdoer’s
misconduct on the one hand, and the victim’s financial status on the other.
Additionally, building on previous research in this vein, the study assesses
whether attitudes towards NDAs are associated with, among other factors,
acceptance of sexual harassment myths, party affiliation, or demographic
characteristics.
Using these methods, I find that both severity of misconduct and a victim’s
financial status had a significant negative effect on the approval of a secret
settlement. That is, a minor act of sexual harassment and a victim’s unstable
financial status each independently increased the probability of NDA approval
compared to a severe act and a victim’s stable financial status. I also find that
participants’ reactions were only weakly correlated with their general views on
NDAs, their acceptance of sexual harassment myths, and their political party
affiliation, indicating that participants were sensitive to the specifics of the case
rather than guided solely by their preexisting opinions and values. Interestingly,
exploring the interaction effect between severity of misconduct and participants’
party affiliation, I find that a Republican affiliation decreased the probability to
reject a secret settlement when it attempted to conceal a severe act of harassment.
Finally, I find evidence to suggest a stronger intuition among financially stable
individuals that information about sexual harassment should be public, when it
pertains to victims of similarly financially stable background.
These findings offer guidance for the future of the #MeToo movement and
for policymakers contemplating confidentiality bans. First, the findings should
encourage leaders of the #MeToo movement to ensure they are protecting the
interests of marginalized groups, because the interests of such groups are not
tantamount to those coming from more privileged backgrounds, especially when
it comes to secret settlements. Specifically, the findings suggest that
policymakers and victim advocates should explore ways to preserve
disadvantaged victims’ bargaining power under a confidentiality-restricting
regime, to ensure that victims with an unstable financial status can still choose a
settlement over a court process and that such a settlement adequately reflects

18. For a detailed explanation of the research design and sample used for the experiment, see infra Part IV.

January 2022

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SECRET SETTLEMENTS

9

their injury.19 Second, the findings emphasize the important role of severity of
misconduct in determining lay people’s attitudes towards secret settlements,
suggesting a pathway towards bipartisan policy prohibiting NDAs at least when
they attempt to conceal severe acts of harassment. Taken together, these findings
emphasize the importance of supporting the current wave of policy with real
data on lay people’s attitudes towards NDAs. Backing such policy moves with
empirical knowledge on the public’s current moral attitudes will help increase
the chances of changing behavior through regulation, minimize attempts to
bypass the legislation, and reduce the need for monitoring and enforcement. In
this sense, the research goes well beyond sexual harassment, and bears
implications for other contexts where NDAs might hinder social change, such
as police brutality.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the theoretical debate in
the literature on secret settlements, and specifically the tension between the
public’s right to know on the one hand, and competing interests such as privacy,
efficiency, and freedom of contract on the other. Part II focuses on law and
policy developments in the context of sexual harassment NDAs, highlighting the
need for empirical data on what the public wants (and does not want) to know.
Part III then addresses existing psychological research which can help us
decipher lay people’s attitudes towards sexual harassment NDAs. Moving to the
empirical part of this Article, Part IV describes the methodology used in this
study, Part V discusses the main findings, and Part VI delineates the normative
implications of the findings for policy that would affect both employers’ and
employees’ behavior in the context of sexual harassment NDAs. The conclusion
explores ways of utilizing the findings and methodology to further expand our
understanding of lay attitudes towards secret settlements, both within and
beyond the realm of sexual misconduct.
I. THE DEBATE OVER SECRET SETTLEMENTS
Over the last several decades, settlements and alternative dispute resolution
(“ADR”) methods have become the overwhelming norm in the resolution of

19. Potential paths towards protecting victims’ bargaining power in the workplace include using union
resources to put pressure on management to consider the interests of employees in sexual harassment settlements
and bringing a class action against an organization particularly prone to sexual harassment. For an analysis of
the relationship between union membership and sexual harassment, and specifically the impact of union
resources for dealing with harassment and union tolerance for harassment on antecedents and consequences of
harassment, see Carrie A. Bulger, Union Resources and Union Tolerance as Moderators of Relationships with
Sexual Harassment, 45 SEX ROLES 723, 728, 738 (2001). On factors that influence the decision to seek legal
relief in the form of class action in response to sexual harassment, see Caroline Vaile Wright & Louise F.
Fitzgerald, Correlates of Joining a Sexual Harassment Class Action, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 265, 267–69
(2009).
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civil disputes,20 despite some important critiques voiced against them.21 More
specifically, it is generally perceived that secret settlements are quite common
and that their numbers are growing.22 Indeed, the discussion of public health
secret settlements has been percolating for years.23 To use just one example, the
danger of some breast implants was kept from the public through secret
settlements, while women continued to undergo this procedure.24 Several
investigative media reports during the late 1980s brought attention to this issue
by revealing that secret settlements were concealing information about
hazardous products and environmental dangers.25 Recently, though, one flavor
of secret settlements has come to the fore, involving sexual misconduct. In this
Part, I sketch the arguments for and against secret settlements and survey the
policy suggestions academics have raised in the context of sexual harassment
NDAs.
A. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SECRET SETTLEMENTS
Why are confidential settlements so pervasive, both in general and
specifically in sexual harassment claims? Some argue that NDAs are necessary

20. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Diminished
Trial, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131, 2146 (2018).
21. These critiques have been made most famously by Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE
L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (critiquing the settlement process); see also David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion
of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2619 (1995) (revisiting Fiss’s critiques of settlement). More recently,
concerns have been raised about the lack of lawyer accountability in the settlement process. Michael Moffitt,
Settlement Malpractice, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1825, 1862 (2019) (finding that although the vast majority of civil
lawsuits are resolved through negotiated settlements, there is currently a lack of lawyer accountability in the
context of legal negotiations and arguing that it should not persist).
22. This is the case both specifically in the sexual misconduct context (see Ronan Farrow, Harvey
Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-settlements (discussing how the use of nondisclosure agreements in sexual
misconduct cases has become “common practice”)) and more generally in the employment context (see Randall
S. Thomas, Norman D. Bishara & Kenneth J. Martin, An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and
Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5, 51 (2015) (explaining that, in general, the
use of various restrictive covenants, including NDAs, in employment contracts has increased over time)). This
phenomenon has also been noted by judges. See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785 (3d
Cir. 1994) (“Disturbingly, some courts routinely sign orders which contain confidentiality clauses without
considering the propriety of such orders . . .”); City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt,
J., concurring) (discussing the “increasing frequency and scope of confidentiality agreements that are ordered
by the court”).
23. Kotkin, supra note 9, at 946; see also Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public
Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 464 (1991) (responding to discovery reform proposals in the
context of cases involving public health and safety); Zitrin, supra note 9, at 118 (criticizing secret settlements in
cases involving public health and safety).
24. See Laleh Ispahani, Note, The Soul of Discretion: The Use and Abuse of Confidential Settlements,
6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 111, 119–21 (1992).
25. See Barry Meier, Deadly Secrets: System Thwarts Sharing Data on Unsafe Products, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Apr. 24, 1988, at 21; Barry Meier, Legal Merry-Go-Round: Case Highlights Lack of Data Sharing, NEWSDAY
(N.Y.), June 5, 1988, at 24; Elsa Walsh & Ben Weiser, Public Courts, Private Justice (pts. 1–4), WASH. POST,
Oct. 23–26, 1988, at A1.
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for corrective justice; that is, to enlarge the bargaining area in order to increase
the chances of settlement.26 According to this argument, settlement often can
only occur if the parties agree to hold its terms (and very existence) silent.
Because compromise can be the only practical recourse for private parties,
making nondisclosure clauses enforceable may be necessary to remedy harms.27
As David Hoffman and Eric Lampmann note with regard to sexual harassment
settlements:
[P]roponents argue that hush contracts are necessary to a privately-ordered
anti-harassment regime. That is, because all agree that anti-harassment law
needs private plaintiffs, and the private bar requires settlements to be viable,
the real question is whether such settlements could exist without enforceable
confidentiality clauses.28

Specifically, some argue that the secrecy of a settlement can be of great
value to a company and should that benefit be removed from the negotiation,
settlement may become less attractive from that company’s perspective.29 In
extreme instances, a company’s inability to negotiate for secrecy may result in
the decision not to offer a settlement at all, rendering trial as the only avenue for
victims to seek recourse.30
Indeed, victim compensation alone might justify the current regime.
Wealth transfers to victims as part of confidential settlements are not trivial.31
26. See generally Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, Criminal, and
Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 314 (2018) (recommending that the fact of settlement, but not
the amount, might in extraordinary circumstances be kept public); see also Ian Ayres, Essay, Targeting Repeat
Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76, 79 (2018) (arguing NDAs should be enforceable only if they meet
certain formalities).
27. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS
L.J. 955, 959, 1009 (1988) (discussing the importance of confidentiality agreements as a negotiating tool).
28. Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 1, at 182. As they further note, “The defenders of hush contracts
take significant comfort from the status quo, where hush contracts are both enforceable and nearly omnipresent.”
Id.
29. Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229, 267
(2018). According to Lisa Klerman, a clinical professor of law and director of the Mediation Clinic at the USC
Gould School of Law, “In my private mediation practice, I have already seen this new law (SB 820) make a
difference in people’s bargaining positions when negotiating settlements,” and as a result of the STAND Act in
California, “employers may not be willing to pay as much for resolving these claims, given that they are now
receiving less in the way of a benefit compared with the prior state of the law that allowed for more ‘airtight’
nondisclosure agreements concerning sexual harassment and sex discrimination allegations.” Jeff Daniels, New
State Laws: From Workplace Harassment Protections to Mandating Women on Boards, CNBC (Dec. 28, 2018,
9:36
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/28/new-state-laws-incalifornia-elsewhere-inspired-by-metoomovement.html; see also David Rocklin, Secret No More: Confidential Settlements and Sexual Harassment
Claims, WOODRUFF SAWYER: INSIGHTS (Oct. 23, 2018), https://woodruffsawyer.com/do-notebook/confidentialsettlements-sexual-harassment-claims (explaining that for many employers confidentiality clauses are “more a
matter of business common sense” than malevolence); Moss, supra note 9, at 878 (arguing that confidentiality
of settlements makes defendants more likely to settle due to “liability costs of lawsuits” which can include both
monetary costs and reputational harms).
30. See Tippett, supra note 29, at 267; Brazil, supra note 27, at 1009.
31. Lynn Parramore, $MeToo: The Economic Cost of Sexual Harassment (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking,
Working Paper, 2018), https://www.ineteconomics.org/research/research-papers/metoo-the-economic-cost-ofsexual-harassment.
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Survivors of sexual misconduct can sometimes recoup significant compensatory
awards, which can give them a sense of closure as well as tangible gains.32
According to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
from 2010 to 2016, “employers have paid out $698.7 million to employees
alleging harassment through the [EEOC’s] administrative enforcement prelitigation process alone.”33 Some of these settlements have also been quite
substantial on an individual basis. A study cited by the EEOC and conducted by
a national liability insurance provider examined “a representative sample of
closed employment dispute claims” and revealed “that 19% of the matters
resulted in defense and settlement costs averaging $125,000 per claim.”34
But even when it comes to lower payments than what will be available to
plaintiffs in court, victims’ financial need may be a key reason to justify the
current regime. While the publicity of sexual misconduct—the result of reduced
use of NDAs—may be beneficial to society overall, some victims, especially
those of lower socio-economic status, may prefer to remain silent and thereby
obtain faster, guaranteed compensation. Indeed, the mistreatment of blue-collar
and working-class women35 and of women from marginalized groups36 has
attracted significantly less public attention than did high profile stories of
harassment and abuse. Yet, an analysis of unpublished EEOC data reveals that
“sexual harassment appears to happen more frequently in industries dominated
by low-wage workers, with minority women working in service industries
especially vulnerable.”37 In those low-wage industries, women file 300% more
claims than in professional fields.38 This rate suggests that the individuals filing
32. Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 1, at 184.
33. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE SELECT TASK FORCE ON
THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 18 (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/select-task-force-studyharassment-workplace.
34. Id. at 19; HISCOX, EMPLOYEE CHARGE TRENDS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES 6 (2015),
https://www.hiscox.com/documents/The-2015-Hiscox-Guide-to-Employee-Lawsuits-Employee-charge-trendsacross-the-United-States.pdf.
35. See, e.g., Susan Chira, We Asked Women in Blue-Collar Workplaces About Harassment. Here Are
Their Stories, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/29/us/blue-collar-womenharassment.html; see also 700,000 Female Farmworkers Say They Stand with Hollywood Actors Against Sexual
Assault, TIME (Nov. 10, 2017, 11:11 AM), https://time.com/5018813/farmworkers-solidarity-hollywood-sexualassault.
36. Collier Meyerson, Sexual Assault When You’re on the Margins: Can We All Say #MeToo?, NATION
(Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/sexual-assault-when-youre-on-the-margins-can-we-all-saymetoo (noting that “[p]eople on the margins—women of color, poor women, undocumented women, and trans
men and women—are uniquely impacted by sexual assault and harassment” and subjected to sexual misconduct
at disproportionately high rates); see also Sarah Childress, Undocumented Sexual Assault Victims Face Backlash
and Backlog, PBS (June 23, 2015), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/undocumented-sexual-assaultvictims-face-backlash-and-backlog.
37. Parramore, supra note 31. In a 2016 report, the EEOC concluded that “60% to 70% of women have
been on the receiving end of sexual harassment on the job at some point during their careers.” Chai R. Feldblum
& Victoria A. Lipnic, Breaking the Silence, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/breakingthe-silence (describing the relevancy of the EEOC’s 2016 report to the debate on sexual harassment spurred by
the #MeToo movement). This rate includes women from all walks of society, not only affluent professionals.
38. See Feldblum & Lipnic, supra note 37.
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most often are likely those that need the payouts most, which may lead them to
prefer an immediate confidential settlement over a lengthy, uncertain battle in
court.39
Related to victims’ interest in an efficient compensation regime is their
desire for confidentiality itself. As plaintiffs’ lawyer Debra Katz has observed,
“[f]or some victims, the promise of confidentiality is actually alluring.”40
Furthermore, according to Katz, survivors “want their privacy protected and if
they feel like they can’t end these situations with a private resolution, they’re
not going to come forward.”41 NDAs might also shield plaintiffs from the still
prevalent phenomenon of “victim blaming.”42 Such victims may also view antiNDA legislation as a second imposition on their autonomy. From this
perspective, victims of sexual misconduct should not be tasked with the burden
of speaking out to end the practice. Rather, the burden should lie with the
perpetrators.43
A final argument for confidentiality is Arthur Miller’s freedom of contract
point, that enforcing confidential settlements respects the private wishes of the
parties involved without impeding the efficient resolution of disputes by the

39. Elsewhere, I discuss the importance of compensation itself as motivation for brining civil lawsuits,
especially when plaintiffs experience financial hardships. See Gilat J. Bachar, Collateral Damages: Domestic
Monetary Compensation for Civilians in Asymmetric Conflict, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 375, 409–10 (2019).
40. Stephanie Russell-Kraft, How to End the Silence Around Sexual-Harassment Settlements, NATION (Jan.
12,
2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-to-end-the-silence-around-sexual-harassmentsettlements; see also Areva Martin, How NDAs Help Some Victims Come Forward Against Abuse, TIME (Nov.
28, 2017, 11:39 AM), https://time.com/5039246/sexual-harassment-nda (discussing reasons victims may want
to keep settlements confidential including unwanted attention, fear of retaliation, shame, and financial
restitution).
41. Russell-Kraft, supra note 40. Relatedly, proponents of confidentiality argue that plaintiffs’ lawyers
have an ethical duty to maximize their clients’ recovery and, therefore, are bound to use secrecy as a bargaining
chip. See Miller, supra note 23, at 489–90.
42. See generally Shadd Maruna & Brunilda Pali, From Victim Blaming to Reintegrative Shaming: The
Continuing Relevance of Crime, Shame and Reintegration in the Era of #MeToo, 3 INT’L J. RESTORATIVE
JUST. 38 (2020).
43. This is similar to past accusations that attempted to shift the blame of sexual assault to women based
on their perceived flirtatiousness or the manner in which they dressed. See Olabisi Adurasola Alabi, Sexual
Violence Laws Redefined in the “MeToo” Era: Affirmative Consent & Statutes of Limitations, 25 WIDENER L.
REV. 69, 76 (2019); see also Debra S. Katz & Lisa J. Banks, Opinion, The Call to Ban NDAs is Well-Intentioned.
But It Puts the Burden on Victims, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
banning-confidentiality-agreements-wont-solve-sexual-harassment/2019/12/10/13edbeba-1b74-11ea-8d585ac3600967a1_story.html (arguing that NDAs can provide victims with “adequate compensation and [] closure
after a traumatic experience” and that the task of speaking out about sexual harassment should not be the
victims’); Paulina Cachero, Mike Bloomberg Promised to Release 3 Women from their NDAs — But Many More
Accusers May Still be Legally-Bound to Remain Quiet, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2020, 6:43 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/legal-experts-say-mike-bloomberg-accusers-misconduct-silenced-ndas-20202 (quoting the response by Gillian Thomas—a senior staff attorney with the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project—
to Bloomberg, Inc.’s statement that it would allow women who were bound by NDAs to be released from them
if they contacted the company: “It struck me as odd that even in this glimpse of transparency that the onus was
put on the person who had the complaint in the first place, as opposed to reaching out to them and saying, ‘I
welcome you telling your story,’” Thomas said. “I think he missed the mark if he was trying to appear really
eager to have their allegations aired”).
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courts.44 According to Miller, confidentiality protects both parties from
vexatious claims: plaintiffs are not harassed by long-lost relatives, and
defendants are shielded from claimants with meritless actions, looking for a deep
pocket.45 For Miller, NDAs thus represent a mutually beneficial pay-for-silence
deal that facilitates settlement, serves judicial economy, and prevents frivolous
copycat lawsuits. Miller argues further that the justice system recognizes a
variety of instances—including discovery, settlement negotiations, and jury
deliberations—in which the public’s interest in knowing the details of a case
pale in comparison with the justice system’s interest in the resolution of disputes.
Since the primary aim “of the judicial system is to resolve private disputes, not
to generate information for the public,” Miller continues, we must favor privacy
over transparency whenever they are in tension.46
In contrast, public access advocates tout the public’s right to know as a core
argument against confidentiality, emphasizing that secret settlements are
particularly dangerous when they endanger public health and safety,47 as is
arguably the case when it comes to sexual harassment. Furthermore, secret
settlements might reduce the deterrent effect of litigation, which, along with
compensation, is a key goal of the tort system.48 Such diminished deterrence
may result especially if secret settlements, by reducing the ability of victims to
coordinate, lead to fewer complaints.49 Responding to arguments made by Miller
and other confidentiality advocates, proponents of public access argue, first, that
there is no empirical evidence demonstrating that settlement rates decrease
without guaranteed confidentiality or that public settlements encourage
frivolous claims.50 Second, contractual terms that violate public policy are never
44. Miller, supra note 23, at 464.
45. Id. at 485.
46. Id. at 441. Miller acknowledges that in rare instances, some public access to information may be
appropriate, but even in those cases, according to his view, there is never a reason to make public the amount of
a settlement: “It is difficult to imagine why the general public would have anything more than idle curiosity in
the dollar value of a settlement . . .” Id. at 484–86. In the context of sexual harassment, this raises a related point
about the degree to which the public’s interest may be affected by a degree a voyeurism or interest in gossip,
rather than a desire for accountability.
47. See generally Zitrin, supra note 9, at 119–21 (discussing several cases where secret settlement
agreements kept information about dangerous products from the public).
48. Zitrin, supra note 9, at 118. In this context, it is interesting to consider any deleterious effects of
preserving sex offenders’ reputation in an attempt to prevent shaming. See, e.g., Colleen M. Berryessa & Chaz
Lively, When a Sex Offender Wins the Lottery: Social and Legal Punitiveness Toward Sex Offenders in an
Instance of Perceived Injustice, 25 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 181, 182 (2019) (suggesting that it may be the “mark”
or stigma of criminality, rather than the sex offender stigma specifically, that leads to punitive sentiments in
reaction to “bad” individuals experiencing a random fortune).
49. However, secret settlements might also result in more reports since victims can avoid publicity and can
secure a settlement with minimal investment.
50. See, e.g., David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer
Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217, 1225 (2003) (noting that “there is no evidence that
these differences among jurisdictions have translated into differences in settlement timing and/or settlement
rates”); Zitrin, supra note 9, at 118 (noting that even where states have enacted restrictions on secret settlements,
there was “no indication of a resulting court logjam, or even that settlement rates have gone down”). While no
studies have been done in those states with sunshine legislation, ATLA asserts that the volume of litigation has
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enforceable,51 nor are lawyers free to increase a settlement figure by allowing
clients to enter into agreements that would require the client to commit illegal
acts.52
Part of the problem academics are facing in this debate is that limiting
secret settlements may have various, at times contradicting, effects which are
difficult to disentangle. According to Scott Moss, confidentiality might, by
increasing the bargaining range, improve the likelihood of settlement.53 That is,
confidentiality can be priced, and parties can extract value for that concession.54
But the problem in determining whether secrecy promotes deterrence is that
information about wrongdoing has competing effects. On the one hand, making
litigation fully transparent (by prohibiting secret settlements) might reduce the
likelihood of settlement post-filing, and consequently reduce the present value
of claims and deterrence. Yet, on the other hand, potential defendants in a
transparent regime may be more likely to “settle” pre-filing so as to avoid the
publicity of litigation, even if they cannot be assured that such settlements will
be truly secret.55 As Moss notes, confidentiality bans may also generate more
settlement data, thus decreasing litigation uncertainty, and reveal unlawful
practices, hence preventing over-avoidance.56 This analysis is further
complicated by lawyer networks, which make even confidential settlements
semi-public.57
decreased since Florida enacted its version of the law. See Dana & Koniak, supra note 50, at 1225 n.18. The
authors further note that “[t]he complete absence of any reports of studies suggesting a decrease in settlement
rates following the enactment of restrictions on secret settlements is notable given the substantial resources of
those interest groups that favor secret settlements, and their ability to fund research.” Id. In contrast, the
economic models of settlement generally maintain that having another term over which to bargain should
increase the likelihood of settlement. See generally Moss, supra note 9.
51. See Dana & Koniak, supra note 50, at 1221; Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 1, at 182.
52. See Dana & Koniak, supra note 50, at 1220. Yet, public access proponents acknowledge that under
current rules of ethics, for a lawyer to reject an advantageous settlement that the client wishes to accept because
the defendant insists on secrecy would constitute an ethical violation. Heather Waldbeser & Heather DeGrave,
Current Development, A Plaintiffs Lawyer’s Dilemma, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 815, 820–26 (2003) (finding
no option for an attorney who opposes a confidential settlement, except perhaps to withdraw). Professional
responsibility scholars have proposed Rule amendments as a remedial measure, yet it was rejected by the ABA
on the grounds that the issue was more appropriate for a legislative solution. See Dana & Koniak, supra note 50,
at 1217 n.1 (reporting that the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission rejected a proposed rule change on secret
agreements and that grounds for rejection included belief that state legislative action would be more appropriate);
Zitrin, supra note 9, at 115–17 (proposing amendment of ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct); Richard
A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Court Rules Must Be Broadened, 55 S.C. L. REV. 883, 904–06 (2004)
(discussing Zitrin’s proposed rule change for South Carolina); Kevin Livingston, Open Secrets, RECORDER, May
8, 2001, at 1 (discussing Zitrin’s proposal to the ABA 2000 Ethics Commission and its rejection); Richard A.
Zitrin, The Judicial Function: Justice Between the Parties, or a Broader Public Interest? 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1565, 1594 (2004) (detailing proposed amendment).
53. Moss, supra note 9, at 878.
54. Levmore & Fagan, supra note 26, at 314.
55. Moss, supra note 9, at 891; see also Zitrin, supra note 9, at 118.
56. Moss, supra note 9, at 881–82.
57. Ben Depoorter, Essay, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil Settlements,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 966–67 (2010) (noting evidence from survey that few attorneys found confidentiality
clauses a barrier to learning about settlement behavior). There is no easy way to disentangle those competing
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B. SHOULD ALL SEXUAL HARASSMENT NDAS BE BANNED?
This unresolved debate over the propriety of secret settlements thus begs
the question: should we ban or limit all secret settlements concealing sexual
misconduct? Or should we simply let the market run its course? Are there any
circumstances under which such settlements are more objectionable than others?
Seeking to find a middle ground between the public access and confidentiality
camps, Ian Ayres argues that rather than banning all sexual harassment NDAs,
we should focus on secret settlements that enable repeat misconduct.58 How?
Ayers suggests using an “information escrow” to be released if another
complaint is brought against the same offender.59 In a similar vein, trying to keep
NDAs alive while eliminating some of their negative consequences, Saul
Levmore and Frank Fagan suggest that disclosing the substance of the settlement
but not the magnitude of monetary payments should be required by law in
extraordinary circumstances.60 Such circumstances may include sexual
misconduct cases, Levmore and Fagan note, where victims may compromise
“too quickly and cheaply” to serve the deterrence goal of settlements, because
offenders know that victims often value privacy too.61 Furthermore, offenders in
such cases are often in a better position to know whether there is a pattern of
abuse, giving rise to information asymmetry.62 Yet we should not ban NDAs

effects and empirical support for their net effect remains unclear. The lack of empirical data is related at least in
part to the difficulty of studying secret settlements. First, it is near impossible to review the “seventy percent of
civil cases that terminate neither by motion nor by trial but by stipulated dismissal to determine how many
contain the actual terms of, or at least some reference to, settlement.” See Kotkin, supra note 9, at 945. Second,
such an undertaking would only count the type of secret settlement in which “the court record would indicate
that the action is dismissed pursuant to a private settlement contract, or that it was resolved by a private settlement
contract known as a stipulation of settlement under seal.” Id. The more common type of secret settlements—
those in which “all that the court record indicates is a stipulation of discontinuance or dismissal”—will remain
invisible. Id. at 945–46. For a rare example of a study that did examine the prevalence of sealed settlements, see
ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, MARIE LEARY, NATACHA BLAIN, STEVEN S. GENSLER,
GEORGE CORT & DEAN MILETICH, SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 1 (Fed.
Judicial Ctr. 2004), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/sealset3_1.pdf. The Federal Judicial Center
looked at 288,846 civil cases in a mostly random sample of fifty-two districts. Id. at 3. One in 227 cases had
sealed settlement agreements, or 1,270 total cases. Id. In 97% of these cases, the complaint is not sealed. Id. at
6. Twenty-seven percent of the cases with sealed settlement agreements are employment cases. Id. at 5. Another
10% are other civil rights cases. Id.
58. Ayres, supra note 26, at 76.
59. Id. (arguing that “NDAs should be enforceable only if they meet certain formalities,” including “if they
explicitly disclose the rights which the survivor retains to report the perpetrator’s behavior to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) . . .”); see also Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows,
111 MICH. L. REV. 145, 145 (2012) (considering the concept of information escrows as trusted intermediaries in
whom individuals could confide and who would disclose that sensitive information only under specified
circumstances).
60. Levmore & Fagan, supra note 26, at 311; see also id. at 342 (arguing that under certain circumstances,
attorneys could be required under professional responsibility rules to report NDAs to authorities or vulnerable
third parties; courts could refuse to enforce such agreements; or jurisdictions could impose mandatory disclosure
requirements as to some or all information concerning these agreements).
61. Id. at 334.
62. Id. at 333.
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altogether, as, among other reasons, victims may hesitate to bring claims if they
know they cannot withdraw them from adjudication.63
Closer to the public access end of the continuum, David Hoffman and Eric
Lampmann focus on “those instances where parties contract to conceal
misconduct of a sexual nature whose nondisclosure carries a steep cost to the
public,”64 arguing that courts ought to generally refuse to enforce such NDAs by
using the public policy doctrine.65 Advocating for public access as well, though
from a different angle, Minna Kotkin argues that lawyers ought to play a role in
preventing secret settlements in labor discrimination cases, including sex
discrimination.66 Specifically, according to Kotkin, civil rights lawyers should
take a stand against confidentiality clauses and request client agreement to avoid
them in advance of representation.67 But which cases carry the steepest cost in
the eyes of the public? To answer this question, this Article identifies at least
two factors that shape the public’s moral judgment on this issue, as explained
below. In the next Part, I survey the legislative and other action that has been
taken thus far to address secret settlements in the context of sexual misconduct.
These actions expose the urgent need for empirical data to guide regulation
efforts and ensure their efficacy, which this Article seeks to begin collecting.

63. Id. at 335.
64. Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 1, at 168.
65. Id. Hoffman and Lampmann direct their critique primarily at NDAs created by organizations to keep
sexual misconduct secret for three reasons: (1) the impact on employees resulting from repeated sexual
misconduct; (2) greater turnover in organizations with repeated harassment; and (3) uncertainty for new
employees when NDAs keep sexual misconduct secret. Id. at 177–78.
66. See Kotkin, supra note 9, at 927.
67. Id.
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II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT SECRET SETTLEMENTS:
FROM THEORY TO LAW AND POLICY
Much like academics, policymakers have also been debating whether and
how to regulate sexual harassment NDAs.68 In the wake of the #MeToo
movement, legislatures have grappled with legislation that might better protect
victims of sexual harassment in the workplace and beyond. In the three years
that followed the viral spread of the #MeToo hashtag, over 230 bills have been
introduced in state legislatures and 19 states have enacted new laws regarding
sexual misconduct.69 This Part surveys such legislative developments insofar as
they pertain to NDAs and argues that such regulation is desperately missing an
empirical perspective about the public’s attitudes.
A. LEGISLATIVE ACTION REGARDING SEXUAL HARASSMENT NDAS
As part of the broader legislative effort mentioned above, several important
developments have occurred specifically with regard to sexual harassment
NDAs. On the federal level, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which became law in
December 2017 under the Trump administration, contains a provision that
eliminates the business deduction for any settlement of a sexual misconduct
claim that includes an NDA.70 On the state level, several states have clamped
down on companies requiring employees to sign NDAs regarding acts of sexual
harassment. Among states doing so were Maryland, Vermont, and
Washington.71 However, approaches to limiting NDAs have varied. For
instance, some states, including New York and New Jersey, have sought to limit
the enforceability of NDAs after the fact, rendering void and unenforceable
clauses in NDAs requiring victims to stay silent about the sexual harassment
they faced.72 Still other states have chosen intermediate solutions, allowing

68. It should be noted that legislative efforts regarding NDAs in recent years go well beyond the sexual
harassment context, and touch upon a variety of other aspects in the workplace. See Orly Lobel, Knowledge
Pays: Reversing Information Flows and the Future of Pay Equity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 550 (2020)
(discussing legislative initiatives in the context of the wage market).
69. NWLC REPORT, supra note 10, at 2 (surveying state laws in the post-#MeToo era).
70. As of Dec. 22, 2017. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13307, 131 Stat. 2054,
2129 (2017) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 162(q)). On some of the ambiguities in that provision, see Leandra
Lederman, Are Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs’ Attorneys’ Fees Inadvertently Disallowed by the Tax Cuts Bill?,
SURLY SUBGROUP (Dec. 19, 2017), https://surlysubgroup.com/2017/12/19/are-sexual-harassment-plaintiffsattorneys-fees-inadvertently-disallowed-by-the-tax-cuts-bill. For a proposal to deny tax deductions for
confidential sexual misconduct settlements that preceded the emergence of the Weinstein allegations and the
Republican tax plan, see Levmore & Fagan, supra note 26, at 343–45.
71. See Daniels, supra note 29 (surveying state laws in the post-#MeToo era); NWLC REPORT, supra note
10, at 8–10. There have also been reports on racial discrimination NDAs changing as a result of the #MeToo
shift. See Khadeeja Safdar, Racial-Discrimination Settlements Usually Came With an NDA. That’s Changing,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 20, 2020, 11:36 AM), https://www-wsj-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.wsj.com/amp/
articles/racial-discrimination-settlements-usually-came-with-an-nda-thats-changing-11603208180.
72. NWLC REPORT, supra note 10, at 9–10 (noting Nevada and Tennessee have passed similar laws).
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NDAs as a condition of employment as long as certain requirements are met.73
California has taken the most aggressive approach. As of 2019, California’s
Stand Together Against Non-Disclosure (STAND) Act effectively made it
unlawful for an employer to create a non-disclosure clause in a sexual
harassment case and related causes of action for any claims “related to” a claim
filed in court or in an administrative proceeding.74 The California act thus
permits some secret settlements (those entered post-demand letter but presuit).75 It also explicitly provides that victims can request nondisclosure of
personally identifying facts, and that parties can agree to keep the amount of the
settlement—but not the underlying facts of the case—secret.76 But, overall, the
California statute represents a significant strike against secret settlements, based
on the understanding that they engender third-party harm and consequently
require public responses.77 The law’s author, California State Senator Connie M.
Leyva, explained that, by banning secret settlements, perpetrators of assault will
be without a major tool to “silence [] and deny [victims] justice.”78
However important and well-intentioned, these regulation efforts have
proceeded without a clear prediction of how they might affect claiming and
settlement behavior. As noted, some argue that these new laws will likely result
73. Id. at 8–10. For example, New Mexico’s law only prohibits private employers from requiring
employees to sign an NDA in settlement agreements related to sexual misconduct. Id. at 8. Other states with
similar legislation include Virginia, Oregon, and Hawaii. Id. at 8–9.
74. Stand Together Against Non-Disclosure Act, CIV. PROC. § 1001 (West 2018). It should be noted that
§ 1001 addresses non-criminal or less serious criminal acts, when they form the basis of an action that has been
filed in court or with an administrative agency. Id. Those NDAs are void going back to 2019. Id. In contrast,
§ 1002 addresses the most serious criminal offenses, even if they are dealt with (and settled) without any court
or administrative filings. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1002 (West 2018). Those NDAs are void going back to
2017. Id. In terms of professional responsibility repercussions, both the defense attorney and plaintiff’s attorney
would be subject to discipline. Id.
75. CIV. PROC. § 1001(a). This point has been noted by practitioners. See California Employers to Face
Raft of New #MeToo Laws, FISHER PHILLIPS (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.fisherphillips.com/newsinsights/california-employers-to-face-raft-of-new-metoo-laws.html (“Therefore, there may be a narrow set of
circumstances in which such clauses may still be utilized in sexual harassment and other similar cases.”).
76. CIV. PROC. § 1001(c), (e).
77. Senate Rules Committee, S. Floor Analysis, S.B. 820, S. 2018 Reg. Sess. 6 (Cal. 2018),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB820
(“This
bill
addresses . . . the use of non-disclosure provisions in settlement agreements, often referred to as ‘secret
settlements.’ These agreements bind people to silence, generally with regard to all of the underlying allegations
in a civil case. As has been seen in widespread media coverage, these secret settlements have the effect of
preventing word from spreading about harassing or discriminatory behavior. This is part of what allows serial
harassers to go undetected, sometimes for years.”).
78. Legislature Approves Leyva Bill Banning Secret Settlements in Sexual Assault and Harassment Cases,
SENATOR CONNIE M. LEYVA (Aug. 24, 2018), https://sd20.senate.ca.gov/news/2018-08-24-legislatureapproves-leyva-bill-banning-secret-settlements-sexual-assault-and. However, California’s law was also met
with opposition. A coalition of businesses, including California’s Chamber of Commerce wrote in opposition
that the bill “will interfere with the settlement of claims alleging sexual harassment or assault, by forcing
companies to trial in order to preserve their public image/brand.” Senate Rules Committee, S. Floor Analysis,
S.B. 820, S. 2018 Reg. Sess. 8 (Cal. 2018). The coalition noted that settlements are often a business decision,
reflecting companies’ cost-benefit analyses disfavoring potentially lengthy trial. Id. Since allegations in a
complaint are usually disputed and must be decided by a trier of fact, the coalition explained, there is a significant
risk to both parties by going to trial. Id.
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in lower payouts for victims of sexual misconduct because when the significant
benefit of secrecy is removed from negotiations, settlement may become less
attractive to the company.79 According to this argument, sunshine laws fail to
properly consider the interests of victims from marginalized or lower socioeconomic groups. While the publicity of sexual misconduct—the result of
reduced use of NDAs—may be beneficial to society overall, victims may prefer
to remain silent and thereby obtain faster compensation and closure than they
would by going to court.80 Sunshine laws that ignore these implications may end
up being disregarded or bypassed. Therefore, one key goal of this paper is to
examine the extent to which lay people actually prefer confidentiality when it
benefits a financially unstable victim, and the extent to which this tendency is
associated with the severity of the misconduct involved.
B. WHY DO LAY ATTITUDES MATTER FOR REGULATING SEXUAL
HARASSMENT NDAS?
To date, the debate about sexual harassment NDAs, despite its high
visibility and important policy implications, has been largely theoretical. Yet in
order to regulate the public’s right to know, we need data on what people want
to know and under what circumstances they consider limiting their right to know
to be most harmful. While typically the terms of settlement agreements between
private parties do not involve the public interest, situations which implicate
social problems like sexual harassment justify taking into account the
appropriate scope of the public’s right to know. Indeed, the backbone of the
argument against confidentiality is the public’s right to know.81 This argument
is reflected in the history of secret settlement regulation in the United States. As
noted, over the years, many have criticized settlement confidentiality for
harming third parties by concealing serious misdeeds. Such criticisms have
traditionally focused on issues such as defective manufacturing and public
hazards. As a result of media reports revealing that secret settlements were
concealing information about hazardous products and environmental dangers in
the 1980s,82 a public outcry led a number of state legislatures to enact sunshine
laws, which generally required judges to consider public health and safety
concerns before sealing court records.83 This history highlights the inseparable
79. Tippett, supra note 29, at 267.
80. See Alabi, supra note 43, at 76 (identifying the burden of speaking out about sexual assault).
81. For a discussion on the public’s right to know in other contexts, see generally Craig D. Feiser,
Protecting the Public’s Right to Know: The Debate Over Privatization and Access to Government Information
Under State Law, 27 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 825 (2000); Fred H. Cate, D. Annette Fields & James K. McBain, The
Right to Privacy and the Public’s Right to Know: The Central Purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 41 (1994); George K. Yin, Reforming (and Saving) the IRS by Respecting the Public’s Right to
Know, 100 VA. L. REV. 1115 (2014).
82. See Meier, Deadly Secrets, supra note 25, at 21; Meier, Legal Merry-Go-Round, supra note 25, at 24;
Walsh & Weiser, supra note 25, at A1.
83. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2004); TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. 76a (West 2003). Florida’s Act and
Louisiana’s virtually identical rule are the two broadest of the few state laws restricting private confidentiality.
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link between the public’s right to know and what the public actually wants (and
doesn’t want) to know. Had it not been for the public outcry regarding the public
health implications of secret settlements, legislative action likely would not have
resulted. A similar process is occurring with the current wave of sunshine laws
resulting from the #MeToo movement. Yet, to ensure the scope of sunshine laws
governing sexual harassment claims tracks the public interest, we need empirical
data. Such data are currently in incredibly short supply. To begin closing this
gap, this Article asks: what is shaping the public’s attitudes on the propriety of
concealing acts of sexual harassment, and under which circumstances do lay
people seek public information about such cases?84
Furthermore, data on lay attitudes towards sexual harassment NDAs can
help pass legislation which regulates such agreements, by providing evidence
regarding political will and the scope of the intervention needed. Given the
binary interest group politics surrounding the debate on NDAs, with the
plaintiffs’ bar and corporations supporting them and feminist groups rejecting
them, information on lay attitudes can help nuance the discourse and better
inform policymakers who are currently operating based on hunches when
considering sunshine laws. Such data might also encourage policymakers to
adopt regulation that need not be “all-or-nothing” but instead strives for
intermediate solutions. For example, if the public tends to endorse secret
settlements when they serve an individual victim’s financial need, policymakers
should explore ways to ensure a confidentiality ban regime still allows
disadvantaged employees to choose a settlement over litigation.
Finally, lay attitudes towards legal issues matter if we aspire to change
behavior through regulation, thereby reducing the need to monitor regulated
players.85 Why? Because even the most carefully drafted legislation may end up
being subject to manipulation, especially by sophisticated players. To ensure the
public buys into the new legislation and practices it without constant monitoring
See Zitrin, supra note 9, at 891–95 (compiling state laws addressing sealed settlement agreements, including
Louisiana’s). However, even Florida’s law covers only settlements “concealing . . . information concerning a
public hazard” and “that has caused and is likely to cause injury.” FLA. STAT. § 69.081(2), (4) (2004). Moreover,
this language limits the law to (1) only hazards that have already caused and are still likely to cause injuries and
(2) only “health and safety” hazards, not harms like financial fraud. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sosnowski,
830 So. 2d 886, 887–88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). The Association of Trial Lawyers of America (“ATLA”)
took the position that lawyers and the courts should resist secrecy agreements, citing danger to the public. See
Philip H. Corboy, Secret Settlements: The Challenges Remain, TRIAL, June 1993, at 122. Of course, secret
settlements also had the effect of inhibiting lawyers from publicizing their successes to attract new clients.
84. For more on the growing field of experimental jurisprudence, which borrows empirical techniques from
the social sciences to clarify core concepts in the law, and on the importance of gathering data on lay attitudes,
see Roseanna Sommers, Experimental jurisprudence, 373 SCIENCE 394 (2021).
85. See Bilz & Nadler, supra note 17, at 241 (arguing that legal regulation can change behavior more
efficiently by changing attitudes, especially those regarding the underlying morality of the regulated behaviors,
because this may drastically reduce the need for enforcement); see also Sunstein, supra note 16, at 121–22
(arguing that people’s beliefs about fairness and justice are the core antecedent of the willingness to cooperate
voluntarily and stand behind laws and policies); Acemoglu & Jackson, supra note 16 (“show[ing] that laws that
are in strong conflict with prevailing social norms may backfire, while gradual tightening of laws can be more
effective in influencing social norms and behavior.”).
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and enforcement (which would be challenging to achieve), we need to obtain
data on what the public’s preferences currently are. Indeed, banning secret
settlements will make some parties worse off, prompting them to try to evade
the regulation. The benefits, in contrast, will be much more dispersed among the
public. Litigants thus have an incentive to collude. If the public is on board with
the legislation, it can serve as a check on parties’ incentive to evade sunshine
laws. Identifying lay people’s moral intuitions regarding NDAs therefore can
help minimize unintended consequences and make regulation efforts more
effective.86 In this sense, we should care about what the public wants both
because it will help get sunshine laws through the legislature and because it will
make enforcement easier with fewer enemies than if regulation banned secret
settlements where both the parties and the public object to it.
This Article thus begins a series of experimental studies aimed at creating
a body of knowledge regarding what the public wishes to know about sexual
harassment. This Article does so by exploring the effect of at least two factors
identified in the literature as potentially important in shaping the discourse
around secret settlements: severity of misconduct and victims’ financial need.
The following Part draws on psychological theories to lay the groundwork
for this study’s hypotheses as to some of the factors driving lay attitudes towards
secret settlements.
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SECRET SETTLEMENTS
Perspectives that have been sorely missed in the discussion over the
legitimacy of secret settlements are a social psychology lens and a behavioral
law and economics perspective. This Part examines three theories that may shed
light on the public’s moral intuitions regarding secret settlements: taboo
tradeoffs, deliberate ignorance, and theories derived from jury decision-making
regarding punitive damages. The competing hypotheses which flow from these
theories further highlight the crucial need for an empirical investigation.
A. TABOO TRADEOFFS
Secret settlements highlight the discomfort people tend to experience in the
face of difficult tradeoffs, such as exchanging money for harm resulting from
wrongdoing. “Taboo tradeoffs,” a theory articulated by Alan Page Fiske and
Philip Tetlock, provides a psychological account of this discomfort.87 The
authors contend that relations in all societies are governed by various
combinations of four fundamental psychological models.88 We categorize

86. Put another way, the public’s current preferences as identified in Acemoglu and Jackson’s study might
be explained by the current system, which needs to be disrupted in order to change these preferences.
87. Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions that Transgress
the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCH. 255, 256 (1997); see also Robert J. MacCoun, The Costs and Benefits of
Letting Juries Punish Corporations: Comment on Viscusi, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1821, 1825–27 (2000).
88. Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 87, at 258.
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individuals and treat category members identically (communal sharing); treat
individuals by their rank within a group (authority ranking); keep score of
outcomes and strive to equalize them (equality matching); or value outcomes on
an absolute metric and make tradeoffs among them (market pricing).89 Each
template has its own rules of appropriate conduct, its own norms of distributive
fairness, and most crucially, its own consensually agreed upon domains of
operation in a community’s life.90
As a result of these different templates, Fiske and Tetlock argue that “costbenefit analysis ignores and usually does violence to normative distinctions that
people value as ends in themselves.”91 They recognize the normative value of
formal cost-benefit analysis and that “taboo tradeoffs are unavoidable . . . . In
practice, there is a limit to the dollars we will spend to enhance our own personal
safety at the workplace or in cars or airplanes, and we will certainly spend less
for the safety of others.”92 But they argue that attempts to apply market pricing
to the domain of human life and suffering will inevitably encounter resistance.
In their words: “It is gauche, embarrassing, or offensive to make explicit tradeoffs among the concurrently operative relational modes.”93 This suggests that
explicitness can discourage tradeoffs that we might otherwise want or need to
make. It may also create discomfort among observers of such tradeoffs, that is,
the public at large. In other words, one outcome of this phenomenon might be
that people would prefer to have certain types of exchanges—such as trading
money for human injury or suffering—kept under wraps, in order to avoid the
discomfort that they may experience as a result of bringing them to light. This
may be especially true when it comes to sexual misconduct, where the exchange
of money for abuse may be particularly hard for people to stomach. Of course,
the opposite may be true as well, as people may wish to be exposed to cases of
sexual harassment due to a degree of voyeurism or for their titillating value. As
detailed below, while the data cannot conclusively answer this question, they
provide an initial point of reference for future research exploring the
mechanisms driving the observed effects.
B. DELIBERATE IGNORANCE
Might people prefer to remain in the dark regarding sexual harassment even
at the cost of accountability for such wrongdoing? According to Ralph Hertwig
and Christoph Engel’s theory, they might. This conscious choice not to seek or
use knowledge or information has been dubbed “deliberate ignorance.”94

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 259.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 290.
Id. at 273.
See generally Ralph Hertwig & Christoph Engel, Homo Ignorans: Deliberately Choosing Not to Know,
11 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 359 (2016).
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Specifically, deliberate ignorance can be an emotion regulation device,
extending to social and moral emotions like anger and disgust.95 But it can also
serve as a strategic device, allowing people to eschew responsibility for their
own actions by avoiding knowledge about how those actions and their outcomes
affect others.96 Applying this theory to sexual harassment may help explain a
preference to keep settlements private from both the general public’s and the
employer’s perspective. The general public may prefer to remain in the dark
regarding settlements of sexual harassment claims, even at the cost of public
accountability for sexual misconduct, as an emotion regulation device which
seeks to limit exposure to incidents that stir anger and disgust. Employers and
others who bear some level of responsibility for incidents of sexual harassment
may choose to remain ignorant about settlements of sexual harassment claims as
a strategic device aimed at avoiding knowledge of the impact such incidents
have on victims.
C. JURY RESEARCH ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Another key element in secret settlements is the compensation typically
retained by the victim/plaintiff as part of the settlement. Social psychological
research can help us predict how the public might perceive monetary
compensation conferred to victims through secret settlements. Research
conducted in the context of public funds recipients suggests that the public may
be suspicious of such compensation.97 As Michele Dauber notes in connection
with the 9/11 compensation fund that conferred monetary relief to victims of the
attack, “[b]eing deserving of aid demands a moral innocence born of blameless
victimization; yet anticipating or receiving compensation implies a moral stain,
a self-regard that properly requires policing and skepticism.”98 Applying a
similar line of reasoning to tort lawsuits, Michelle Chernikoff Anderson and
Robert MacCoun predicted that jurors would be reluctant to award punitive
damages when plaintiffs themselves receive the award, as, they reasoned, “a
punitive award of the magnitude necessary to meet jurors’ defendant-focused
goals (retribution and/or deterrence) would provide the plaintiff with an unjust

95. Id. at 361; see also Cendri A. Hutcherson & James J. Gross, The Moral Emotions: A SocialFunctionalist Account of Anger, Disgust, and Contempt, 100 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 719, 733–34 (2011)
(discussing the important role of emotion in moral judgment and decision making and the need to distinguish
between specific moral emotions).
96. Hertwig & Engel, supra note 94, at 362–63; Linda Thunström, Klaas van’t Veld, Jason F. Shogren &
Jonas Nordström, On Strategic Ignorance of Environmental Harm and Social Norms, 124 REVUE D’ECONOMIE
POLITIQUE 195, 196–97 (2014).
97. Michele Landis Dauber, The War of 1812, September 11th, and the Politics of Compensation,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 289, 291–92 (2003).
98. Id. at 291; see also DAVID M. ENGEL, THE MYTH OF THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY: WHY WE DON’T SUE 12–
14 (2016) (discussing Americans’ ambivalent view of tort law, due to placing price-tags on human injuries).
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‘windfall profit,’ especially considering that the jurors would have already
attempted to make the plaintiff whole via compensatory damages.”99
And yet Anderson and MacCoun’s findings show little evidence of concern
about a plaintiff windfall. Rather, their subjects actually preferred awarding
punitive damages when they believed that the plaintiff would be the recipient of
the funds.100 According to their analysis, this result may indicate that lay people
“intended the award to serve a restitutive or restorative function, rather than (or
in addition to) purely deterrent or retributive functions.”101 In this sense, their
findings join those arguing that people feel that fair punishment for wrongdoing
requires acts of restitution for restorative, rather than compensatory, purposes.102
According to this view, the offender has torn the social fabric, and public acts of
restitution serve to repair that damage.
Taken together, these bodies of theory and research from the realm of
psychology help form hypotheses for the current research. Indeed, a key goal of
this study is to begin answering the question: to what extent, and under what
circumstances, do lay people endorse sexual harassment NDAs? While
psychological theories such as taboo tradeoffs and deliberate ignorance may
drive us to assume that people will generally favor secret settlements, especially
when it comes to sensitive issues such as sexual misconduct, jury research on
punitive damages encourages a more nuanced view accounting for restorative or
restitutive goals focusing on victims. As explained in the next Part, such a
nuanced view may apply, among other factors, to the severity of sexual
misconduct involved and to the victim’s financial status. Building on this
interdisciplinary knowledge, I designed an experiment that tests the effect of
these two variables on lay attitudes towards sexual harassment secret
settlements. The following Parts describe the methods used in this study, its main
findings, and their implications.
IV. METHODS
To begin closing the knowledge gap regarding lay attitudes towards NDAs,
I employed a survey experiment administered to a representative sample of
Americans, asking about their endorsement or rejection of secret settlements (the
dependent variable, DV). Using a 2X2 factorial design, the study focuses on two
independent variables (IVs) identified in the literature as potentially crucial to
the endorsement of secret settlements: (1) the severity of the wrongdoer’s
99. Michelle Chernikoff Anderson & Robert J. MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror Assessments of
Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 316 (1999).
100. Id. at 326.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, Rethinking the Sanctioning Function in Juvenile Court:
Retributive or Restorative Responses to Youth Crime, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 296, 297 (1995); Mark Umbreit,
Crime Victims Seeking Fairness, Not Revenge: Toward Restorative Justice, 53 FED. PROB. 52, 52 (1989)
(arguing that this restorative function is not limited to offenses that occur in preexisting relationships and
documenting the importance of restoration in crimes involving strangers).
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misconduct (severe/ minor) and (2) the victim’s financial status (high/ low).
Additionally, the study tests whether attitudes towards NDAs are associated with
participants’ preexisting opinions on NDAs or sexual harassment, their political
affiliation, and/or demographic characteristics.
A. HYPOTHESES AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In designing the experiment, I hypothesized, first, that participants will
reject the secret settlement when the severity of the wrongdoer’s act is high (H1).
Severity of harassment was defined in accordance with a scale created by
previous research, which found lay people identified certain acts of
harassment—such as sexual jokes or remarks—as less severe than others
involving unwanted touch or exposure (“flashing”).103 Previous studies have
shown that lay people tend to associate more severe harassment with greater
harm to victims.104 Based on such studies, as well as the jury research described
above, I hypothesized that participants will register objection to the concealment
of acts that generate greater harm to victims, due to a restorative or restitutive
perspective.105 Furthermore, previous research in the criminal justice context has
proved that greater severity is associated with greater moral outrage.106
Therefore, I predicted that more severe harassment will also trigger rejection of
a secret settlement because in such cases lay people will be more outraged by
the act from a punitive perspective, thus seeking public condemnation. In
contrast, I suspected that minor acts of harassment perceived as less damaging
and outrageous will trigger approval of the settlement, since lay people will view
such exchanges as the parties’ prerogative rather than part of the public’s right
to know.
Second, I hypothesized that participants will approve the secret settlement
when the victim was financially unstable (H2). As noted above, H2 was based
on findings regarding jury decision-making in punitive damages cases, showing
jurors’ preference to have the plaintiff receive the award money.107 Such
103. See Stacie A. Cass, Lora M. Levett & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of Harassment Severity and
Organizational Behavior on Damage Awards in a Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Case,
28 BEHAV. SCIS. & L. 303, 305–07 (2010); David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, A Hierarchy of Sexual
Harassment, 121 J. OF PSYCH. 599, 602 (1987); Douglas D. Baker, David E. Terpstra & Bob D. Cutler,
Perceptions of Sexual Harassment: A Re-examination of Gender Differences, 124 J. OF PSYCH. 409, 411 (1990).
That said, there might not be a uniform reaction among participants to various forms of harassment (some of
which may also be considered criminal behavior, which may elicit a different reaction). This caveat should be
kept when considering the findings.
104. Cass et al., supra note 103, at 305–07.
105. In contrast, in line with the theory of taboo tradeoffs, one could argue that “money for silence” is more
of a taboo when it comes to severe misconduct, and thus we should expect the public to be more accepting of
NDAs in severe cases of sexual harassment based on that theory. Relatedly, if very harmful activity is especially
difficult for a victim to report (e.g., rape), a social planner who cared about maximizing welfare may want to
allow secret settlements in this space rather than ban them, in order to ensure there was reporting.
106. Carlsmith & Darley, supra note 17, at 199–200.
107. See, e.g., Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade & John W. Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of
Plaintiff’s Requests and Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 445, 448 (1999);
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research indicated that lay people seek victim restoration and are not as worried
about a victim/plaintiff windfall. People may also perceive poor victims as more
eligible for restoration than richer victims, given an assumption that gender
power dynamics are more at play in the case of financially struggling victims.
Furthermore, H2 stemmed from research showing that jurors tend to sympathize
with poorer plaintiffs, a phenomenon described as “the underdog factor,”108
which is contrary to the common belief that people tend to be suspicious of poor
people.109 Based on these two threads of studies, I predicted that financially
unstable victims will trigger greater approval of a secret settlement compared to
victims who are financially stable, as in such cases, lay people will be more
concerned about the victim’s interest in closure and restoration than they will be
with the public’s right to know.
Third, with regard to the interaction effect between the two main
independent variables, I hypothesized that the victim’s financial status will
matter less when the act of harassment was severe than when it was minor (H3).
That is, the prediction was that participants’ reaction to a victim’s financial
status will depend on harassment severity only when severity is low, such that
participants in that condition will tend to approve the secret settlement when
victim financial status is low and reject it when victim financial status is high.
This aspect of the study was exploratory, and the hypothesis stemmed primarily
from the assumption that the severity concern will trump the financial concern
among participants. That is, I assumed that lay people will be more concerned
about a poor victim’s interest in closure and restoration than they would be about
a richer victim’s parallel interest as long the harassment act was minor, thus
avoiding a potential conflict with the public’s desire to know about severe acts
of sexual harassment.
Fourth and finally, given that gender stereotypes tend to affect evaluations
of sexual misconduct, I hypothesized that they may serve as a moderator for the
effects on NDA approval (H4). In other words, I assumed that the effect of
severity and/or financial status may interact with participants’ beliefs in sexual
harassment myths. This hypothesis was based on previous research which
showed the key role of acceptance of sexual harassment myths in determining
lay attitudes towards issues related to sexual harassment.110
Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 99, at 326 (describing their findings that jurors preferred to have punitive
damages awarded to plaintiffs than given to charity).
108. William R. Darden, James B. DeConinck, Barry J. Babin, & Mitch Griffin, The Role of Consumer
Sympathy in Product Liability Suits: An Experimental Investigation of Loose Coupling, 22 J. BUS. RSCH. 65, 68–
69 (1991) (finding a negative relationship between plaintiff financial situation and extent of verdict, which was
mediated by consumer-juror sympathy); Peter J. Van Koppen & Jan Ten Kate, Individual Differences in Judicial
Behavior: Personal Characteristics and Private Law Decision-Making, 18 L. & SOC. REV. 225, 228–29 (1984)
(identifying and discussing the so-called “underdog factor”).
109. See Dauber, supra note 97, at 291–92.
110. See, e.g., Netta Barak-Corren & Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, What’s in a Name? The Disparate Effects
of Identifiability on Offenders and Victims of Sexual Harassment, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUDS. 955, 964 (2019)
(using a series of vignette-based experiments to study the identifiability effect in sexual harassment, and
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Participants were divided into four groups and each group was randomly
assigned to one of four conditions,111 which represented combinations of the two
independent variables:
•
•
•
•

Sexual joke (low severity) + financially struggling victim (low
financial status)
Sexual joke (low severity) + financially stable victim (high financial
status)
Exposing genitalia (high severity) + financially struggling victim
(low financial status)
Exposing genitalia (high severity) + financially stable victim (high
financial status)

In all conditions, participants read the scenario below, depicting a sexual
harassment complaint submitted by a female employee against her male
manager. Participants were subsequently asked to answer a question regarding
their approval or rejection of a confidential settlement under the circumstances
of the scenario (a binary should sign/should not sign question).112 The scenario
and question are reproduced below in full (alternative treatments are bracketed).
John is a supervisor in a private security company.113 [John directs a sexual
joke at one of his employees, Laura.114] [John exposes his genitalia to one of
his employees, Laura.]115 Laura files a complaint for sexual harassment
against John with the company.

including an indicator of “rape myth” acceptance); Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 217, 218–19 (1980) (using a similar indicator in the context of rape myths and
analyzing hypotheses founded in social psychological and feminist theory purporting that the acceptance of rape
myths can be predicted from attitudes such as sex role stereotyping, adversarial sexual beliefs, and sexual
conservatism).
111. As explained below, there were no statistically significant differences across the covariates in the four
treatment groups.
112. A vignette design is a good fit for this study despite its known limitations, including limited external
validity and potential unknown confounds. Generally, vignettes have been found more effective than opinion
surveys in eliciting candid responses, especially when gathering data on awareness and attitudes. See, e.g., Nancy
E. Schoenberg & Hege Ravdal, Using Vignettes in Awareness and Attitudinal Research, 3 INT’L J. SOC. RSCH.
METHODOLOGY 63, 64 (2000) (describing benefits of vignette-based research, including depersonalization that
encourages an informant to think beyond his or her own circumstances, an important feature for sensitive topics).
113. The type of company is indicated for two reasons. First, to control for participants’ speculations about
industry norms and the setting they envision while reading the vignette. Second, as noted, given the media’s
tendency to focus on high-profile cases, it is important to highlight the experience of blue-collar populations,
such as workers in the security sector.
114. The names “John” and “Laura”—highly common “white” names—were intentionally chosen to hold
constant what participants are imagining in terms of the race of the offender and the victim. See Daniel M. Butler
& Jonathan Homola, An Empirical Justification for the Use of Racially Distinctive Names to Signal Race in
Experiments, 25 POL. ANALYSIS 122, 122 (2017).
115. These specific harassment treatments were chosen based on ranking of perceived severity developed
by David E. Terpstra and Douglas D. Baker. See Terpstra & Baker, supra note 103. Their ranking was later used
with a non-student population by Baker et al., supra note 103.
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In response to Laura’s complaint, the security company conducts an internal
investigation, in which the complaint is substantiated.116 The company117 then
offers Laura a “take-it-or-leave-it” settlement: Laura will receive an
undisclosed amount of money,118 will waive all future claims against the
company (that is, she will not be able to sue the company in court), and will
sign a non-disclosure agreement, which requires her to never speak about the
incident again.
Should Laura decline the settlement offer, she can file a lawsuit against the
security company. The court record will be available to the public, but Laura
can choose to have her personal information removed from the record.
Laura has changed jobs and no longer works for the company. [She is
struggling financially.] [She is financially stable.]
Assume that you are a neutral consultant requested to give an opinion about
this incident.119 In your opinion, what should happen next?
•

•

Laura and the security company sign the settlement agreement.
Laura receives the settlement money. She cannot discuss the incident
nor sue the company.
Laura and the security company do not sign the settlement
agreement. Laura does not receive the settlement money. She can
discuss the incident and can file a lawsuit against the company.

116. This sentence denotes an attempt to hold constant any concerns of false accusations. Scholars and
commentators are often preoccupied with the question of false accusations in sexual misconduct cases, spilling
a considerable amount of ink debating what value ought to be placed on falsely accused defendants’ rights to
avoid harm, even should they settle with an accuser to avoid the spotlight. See Levmore & Fagan, supra note
26, at 344 (“Mandatory transparency, as required by some sunshine laws, likely goes too far because news of [a
plaintiff’s] claim[s] will bring forth claimants who erroneously, irrationally, or strategically believe [the
tortfeasor] injured them”); see also Ian Ayres, supra note 26, at 77 (“NDAs may also help protect those who are
falsely accused or have a valid legal defense from the negative reputational consequences of having been accused
and having paid to settle an accusation of sexual misconduct”); see also Bret Stephens, Opinion, For Once, I’m
Grateful for Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/opinion/trumpkavanaugh-ford-allegations.html (“Falsely accusing a person of sexual assault is nearly as despicable as sexual
assault itself. It inflicts psychic, familial, reputational, and professional harms that can last a lifetime.”).
Nevertheless, commentators often overstate the frequency of unsubstantiated allegations. See Katie Heaney,
Almost No One is Falsely Accused of Rape, THE CUT (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/article/false-rapeaccusations.html (explaining that, since only 8 to 10% of rapes are reported and about 5% of reports may be
unsubstantiated, false accusations account for around 0.5% of reported rapes).
117. It should be noted that the settlement agreement offered in the scenario is between Laura and the
company rather than the offender, John. This is a significantly more common scenario than a settlement between
individuals, allowing the study to yield implications for employers. While there was indication that this
distinction registered with pretest participants, it would be interesting to explore in future research whether
manipulating the identity of the party offering the settlement affects the level of NDA approval.
118. The amount is left undisclosed to control for any effects of the amount itself. Of course, it is possible
that participants will assume different amounts under the different treatments. However, there is no reason to
think that such assumptions will systematically affect the dependent variable, which is an issue left to be explored
in future research.
119. The participants’ position was chosen after several iterations in pretests indicated it was the clearest to
participants. However, it is not without its difficulties. Participants may have interpreted their task in different
ways; either indicating what people want from a public perspective or as advising the parties at hand. This aspect
of the study should be pursued in future research.
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As noted, I also included an indicator of “sexual harassment myths”
acceptance.120 Participants were asked to rank their level of agreement (on a 15 Likert scale) with a number of statements aimed at assessing their level of
acceptance of sexual harassment myths related to victims’ claiming behavior.
For example, one of the statements read: “False accusations of sexual
harassment are a bigger problem than unreported harassment” (see Appendix
I for the full list of statements). The order of the opinion survey and the vignette
were randomized between subjects, to counterbalance any order effects.
Statements expressing a positive evaluation of victims were reverse-coded to
align with statements expressing a negative evaluation.
Participants were also asked about their general views regarding NDAs
using positive and negative statements which were aligned through reversecoding to create a 1-5 pro-NDA score for each participant. For instance, one of
the statements read: “It is better for society if lawsuits are settled confidentially.”
The goal of these questions was twofold. First, similar to the acceptance of
sexual harassment myths score, these questions were meant to assess the
potential role of preexisting views about secret settlements as a moderator of the
independent variables’ effect. Second, these questions were meant to ensure the
internal validity of the study; in other words, to guarantee that the experiment is
testing approval of secret settlements and not some other construct. A positive
correlation between the answers to the general questions about NDAs and the
question asked in the experiment proves that this is the case. As explained below,
such a correlation was indeed found. That said, the fact that the correlation was
weak indicates that participants were sensitive to the specifics of the scenario
presented to them rather than guided only by their preexisting opinions.121
Finally, as part of the exploratory section of the survey, participants were
also asked to rate the level of importance that additional items of information
about the harassment scenario would have for their decision on whether to
endorse the secret settlement. This matrix question, aimed primarily at assessing
directions for future research, included a total of eight information items: (1)
costs of litigating the case in court; (2) whether the wrongdoer has a pattern of
sexually harassing his colleagues; (3) whether the victim was represented by a
lawyer; (4) whether the wrongdoer agrees to go to therapy as part of the
settlement agreement; (5) the victim’s likelihood of winning a lawsuit against
the company in court; (6) the amount of money the victim will likely win if her
lawsuit against the company is successful; (7) whether the wrongdoer was
terminated from the company as a result of his behavior; and (8) the amount of
money the company agreed to pay as part of the settlement agreement.

120. Cf. Burt, supra note 110, at 117.
121. With regard to both the sexual harassment myths and the NDA views analyses, I used Cronbach’s
Alpha to ensure that averaging items in these indicators is justified, because all items were indeed related to the
same construct. See generally Klaas Sijtsma, On the Use, the Misuse, and the Very Limited Usefulness of
Cronbach’s Alpha, 74 PSYCHOMETRIKA 107 (2009).
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B. SAMPLE
A power analysis indicated that a sample of approximately 350 participants
is needed to have 80% power to detect the hypothesized effect, assuming an
approximate effect size (Cohen’s d) of 0.3.122 However, based on size of
population measures, the recommended sample size was at least 385
participants. As a result, a representative sample of 414 American adults (51%
women, Mage=45.3 years old, SD=16.3 years) was recruited to participate in an
online study through the “Prolific” survey company, in keeping with the U.S.
census race, age, and gender quotas.123 The company provided basic
demographic data on the participants. In addition, participants were also asked
about their education, household income, party affiliation, and U.S. state of
residence. As for party affiliation, 53.6% of participants identified as Democrats,
18.2% said they leaned Republican, 28.2% identified as Independents, and the
rest either did not reply or mentioned they were “something else.”124 The goal
of asking participants about their state of residence was to control for any effect
that recently enacted sunshine laws limiting the use of sexual harassment NDAs
in some states have had on participants’ responses to the vignette. As explained
below, I did not identify such an effect of participants’ state of residence on their
attitudes.
TABLE 1: COMPOSITION OF SAMPLE
Female
Age
Race
White
Black
Asian
Mixed

Mean/ %
51%
45.3
70.46%
13.8%
7.5%
4.6%

122. Power analysis was based on a common 80% power, alpha=0.05 and a small effect size of 0.3 (this
effect is smaller than the common effect size in psychological research - Cohen’s d=0.4; see Marc Brysbaert,
How Many Participants Do We Have to Include in Properly Powered Experiments? A Tutorial of Power
Analysis with Reference Tables, 2 J. COGNITION 1, 1–2 (2019). Using a small effect size for the power analysis
guarantees that even a small effect would be detected. It should be noted that the effect size found in the pretest
was not used to determine the sample size given the now established norm indicating that pilot studies are next
to worthless to estimate effect size. See id. at 5–7.
123. As part of the analysis, I opted for not using attention checks to monitor meaningful completion of the
survey due to concerns about introducing a selection bias. See Darden et al., supra note 108, at 78–79. In lieu of
attention checks, I eliminated responses which recorded a response time of under two standard deviations below
the mean (the mean was approximately six minutes).
124. In this sense, the sample is not representative of the 2020 electorate, which is largely equally divided
between the three major parties: 34% identify as independents, 33% identify as Democrats and 29% identify as
Republicans. See John Gramlich, What the 2020 Electorate Looks Like by Party, Race and Ethnicity, Age,
Education and Religion, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/10/26/what-the-2020-electorate-looks-like-by-party-race-and-ethnicity-age-education-and-religion.
An over-representation of Democrats is highly common in online survey research. See generally Jelke
Bethlehem, Selection Bias in Web Surveys, 78 INT’L STAT. REV. 161 (2010) (discussing various methodological
issues in online surveys, including the underrepresentation of certain portions of the population).
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Other
Party Affiliation
Democrat
Republican
Independent
Residence in a U.S. State which Prohibits
or Limits NDAs
Education
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s/ Professional Degree
Doctorate
Household Income
Less than $25,000
$25,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $99,999
$100,000 - $199,999 or more

Vol. 73:1

3.63%
53.6%
18.2%
28.2%
25.4%
0.5%
12.1%
32.4%
34.8%
17.4%
2.9%
20.3%
23.9%
32.1%
23.7%

Note: N=414; N (Party Affiliation) =390. As noted, the remaining participants either chose
not to reply to this question or mentioned they were “something else.” There were no
statistically significant differences across the covariates in the four treatment groups.

The limitations of experimental methods center on their external validity,
meaning the degree to which results are generalizable to broader phenomena of
interest. Experiments also reduce scenarios to a few core variables, often
implemented over a short period, compared with the complex and “messy”
nature of everyday life situations. This is specifically true for survey experiments
that are limited in simulating scenarios and their consequential emotional
responses. In this case, the experiment cannot recreate the exact emotional
reaction prompted by workplace sexual harassment. However, the limited
emotional response is also a positive feature of the design, allowing researchers
to produce more useful information. Furthermore, to mitigate some of these
concerns, I conducted the survey using a nationally representative sample and
provided vignettes that closely mimic real-life scenarios. I also reran my
experiments several times, as pretests on smaller groups of participants, to
demonstrate the reliability of the results. Results remained largely consistent.
I report my findings from the experiments by fitting a linear probability
model. To assess the robustness of the OLS regression results, I performed
several sensitivity checks. Importantly, I conducted an analysis of the data using
logistic regressions (logit) and those yielded similar results.125 In the next Parts,
I elaborate the findings of the study and discuss their implications.

125. For more on the choice between linear and logit regression, see Paul Von Hippel, Linear vs. Logistic
Probability Models: Which is Better, and When?, STAT. HORIZONS (July 5, 2015),
https://statisticalhorizons.com/linear-vs-logistic. It should also be noted that I chose to use a regression analysis
rather than ANOVA which is typical in 2X2 factorial designs because the linear probability model allows the
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V. FINDINGS
A. GENERAL APPROVAL OF A SECRET SETTLEMENT ACROSS CONDITIONS
The first question of interest was the extent to which participants across all
four experimental conditions tended to approve or reject the secret settlement.
An analysis of the data revealed that across the four conditions, a larger
percentage of participants (58.21%) rejected the secret settlement (M=0.417;
SE=0.02, coded as 0=rejection; 1=endorsement).126 That is, participants
generally tended to reject a secret settlement more than they did to endorse it.
B. EFFECT OF SEVERITY OF MISCONDUCT AND VICTIM FINANCIAL STATUS
The next question was the extent to which the two main independent
variables had an effect on the dependent variable, secret settlement approval. In
accordance with H1 and H2, and as shown in Figure 1 below, both severity of
misconduct and victim’s financial status had a statistically significant negative
effect on secret settlement approval. Low severity decreased the probability of
participants’ rejection of the secret settlement compared to high severity (β=0.14; p=0.003; R2=0.0562; F(2,411)=12.9). A victim’s low financial status also
decreased the probability of participants’ rejection of the secret settlement
compared to a high financial status (β=-0.18; p<0.001; R2=0.0562;
F(2,411)=12.9).127 In other words, low victim financial status increased the
mean approval in both the low severity and the high severity conditions.
Similarly, low severity increased the mean approval in both the low financial
status and high financial status conditions (see Figure 1 below).128 However,
contrary to H3, the interaction term between the two independent variables—
severity and financial status—was not statistically significant (p>0.1), meaning
that severity and victim’s financial status affect people’s attitudes
independently.129

inclusion of additional control variables in the model, including age, gender, education and the like, thus
providing a more nuanced picture of the results. Further, regression coefficients also provide a direct point
estimate of the effects, unlike the results of an ANOVA.
126. I used a difference in proportion test (z test) to determine whether the difference between the number
of participants that approved the secret settlement and the number of participants that rejected it was significant
between conditions. Differences were statistically significant (p<0.005).
127. The effect size (Cohen’s d) for victim’s financial status was 0.38 and for severity of misconduct 0.29,
which are considered between small and medium effects. According to the Cohen’s convention, d = 0.2 is
considered a “small” effect size, 0.5 represents a “medium” effect size and 0.8 a “large” effect size. See JACOB
COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 473–81 (2d ed. 1988).
128. MLSev;LFS=0.586, SD=0.49, N=104; MHSev;HFS=0.39, SD=0.49, N=105; MHSev;LFS=0.435, SD=0.5,
N=101; MHSev;HFS=0.26, SD=0.44, N=104.
129. In terms of direction, though, the interaction term indicated that severity might decrease the effect of
financial status (β=0.05).
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FIGURE 1: APPROVAL OF SECRET SETTLEMENT BY SEVERITY OF
MISCONDUCT AND VICTIM FINANCIAL STATUS
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Note: N=414

C. EFFECT OF OTHER VARIABLES
To further probe these effects, alongside testing the effect of the two main
independent variables, the OLS regression analysis allowed for a more nuanced
understanding of the findings, testing the effect of other control variables. In
order to ensure the accuracy of the regression models, and to test H4, I first
examined the correlation coefficients between several key variables, which I
suspected might be associated (see Table 2 below). Positive correlation was
indeed found between acceptance of sexual harassment myths and approval of
the secret settlement presented in the vignette (r=0.16, p<0.001), as well as
between generally favorable views of NDAs and approval of the secret
settlement (r=0.22; p<0.001). I also found a positive correlation between party
affiliation and approval of the secret settlement (r=0.2, p<0.01, N=390),
indicating that the more participants leaned Republican or Independent in their
party affiliation, the more they tended to approve the secret settlement. The
correlation between party affiliation and acceptance of sexual harassment myths
was also positive (r=0.2, p<0.001).
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While these correlation coefficients were positive, they were relatively
weak.130 In contrast, stronger correlation was found between acceptance of
sexual harassment myths and pro-NDA views (r=0.46; p<0.001). Due to this
moderate correlation, I included these variables separately in the regression
models below (see Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 3).
TABLE 2. CORRELATION MATRIX FOR KEY CONTROL VARIABLES
Secret
Settlement
Approval

Party
Affiliation

Secret
1.0
Settlement
Approval
Party
0.1277**
1.0
Affiliation
Favorable
0.2226*** 0.1284**
Views of
NDAs
Acceptance
0.1575*** 0.2043***
of Sexual
Harassment
Myths
Residence in
0.0126
-0.1030*
State that
Limits NDAs
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Favorable
Views of
NDAs

Acceptance
of Sexual
Harassment
Myths

Residence
in State
that Limits
NDAs

1.0
0.4566***

1.0

-0.0521

-0.0152

1.0

As shown in Table 3 below, some of the demographic controls proved
statistically significant. Age had a positive effect on secret settlement approval,
such that increase in age increased approval of a secret settlement (β=0.005;
r=0.18; p<0.001).131 Similarly, in one of the models, household income also had
a positive effect on approval (β=0.05; p=0.03). Party affiliation had a positive
effect on approval as well, meaning that a Republican or Independent affiliation
increased approval of a secret settlement compared to a Democratic affiliation
(β=0.06; p=0.04; N=390). In contrast, and counterintuitively, neither gender nor
level of education had a statistically significant effect on approval.132

130. Generally, a correlation between two variables is considered strong if the absolute value of r is greater
than 0.75. However, the definition of a “strong” correlation can vary from one field to the next and is context
dependent. See Marcin Kozak, What is Strong Correlation?, 31 TEACHING STAT. 85, 85 (2009).
131. The small effect observed in the OLS regression might be a result of age being a continuous variable
(not standardized). Pearson’s Correlation is often a better index for effect size of continuous variables, which is
why it was included as well.
132. Gender: p>0.1, Education: p>0.1. Given the possibility that gender might be correlated with other
indicators, it was examined in several different regression models, including by itself. However, gender was not
found to be statistically significant in any of the tested models.
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Furthermore, both acceptance of sexual harassment myths and favorable
views of NDAs had a statistically significant positive effect on secret settlement
approval (β=0.095; p=0.007; β=0.125; p<0.001, respectively). However, in
contrast to H4, neither of these indicators acted as a moderator between the
independent and the dependent variables. That said, when both indicators were
added to the regression model, acceptance of sexual harassment myths was no
longer significant (see Table 3). As noted, this was likely due to the moderate
positive correlation between the two indicators.
TABLE 3. OLS REGRESSION OF APPROVAL OF A SECRET SETTLEMENT
VARIABLES

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Severity of Misconduct

-0.141**
(0.0473)
-0.186***
(0.0473)

-0.136**
(0.0474)
-0.206***
(0.0471)
0.0593*
(0.0285)
-0.00551

-0.121**
(0.0470)
-0.220***
(0.0464)
0.0579*
(0.0274)
7.07e-05

(0.0543)
-0.0124
(0.0267)
-0.00245
(0.0497)
0.0470
(0.0248)
0.00572***
(0.00145)
0.0955**

(0.0545)
-0.0206
(0.0256)
0.0318
(0.0473)
0.0533*
(0.0246)
0.00560***
(0.00145)

Victim’s Financial Status
Party Affiliation (Dem/Rep/In)
Residence in State that Limits
NDAs
Level of Education
Gender
Household Income
Age
Acceptance of Sexual Harassment
Myths

(0.0353)
Favorable Views of NDAs
Constant

0.582***
(0.0416)

Observations
414
R-squared
0.056
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

-0.0177
(0.132)

0.125***
(0.0288)
-0.125
(0.134)

390
0.148

390
0.170

Note: N=414 for Model 1; N=390 for Model 2 and Model 3 due to fewer observations for
party affiliation variable (the remaining participants either chose not to reply to this
question or mentioned they were “something else.”) This table shows OLS regression
results. Model 1 includes only the two main independent variables. As noted, due to
moderate positive correlation between acceptance of sexual harassment myths and
favorable views of NDAs, these were included in separate regression models (Model 2 and
Model 3).
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In addition to these controls, as noted, participants were also asked about
their U.S. state of residence, in order to test whether residence in a state that
limits sexual harassment NDAs affected participants’ reaction to the treatment.
An analysis of the responses indicated that state of residence did not have a
statistically significant effect on approval of the secret settlement (p>0.1).133
This meant that at least at the time the survey was conducted, residence in a state
that passed sunshine laws in the context of sexual harassment claims did not
have a statistically significant effect on approval of a secret settlement.134
Two additional exploratory findings merit attention. First, the interaction
effect between a victim’s financial status and a participant’s household income
was statistically significant (β=-0.3; p=0.04, see Table 4 in Appendix II). This
finding indicates that participants’ reaction to a victim’s financial status
depended on their own level of income, such that a one-unit increase in income
increased the negative effect of a victim’s financial status on approval of a secret
settlement by -0.3. Simply put, higher income participants were even more
inclined to approve the secret settlement when the victim was struggling
financially. While a dependent relationship between a variable such as victim
financial status and participants’ household income seems intuitive, the direction
of the relationship—increasing the negative effect of financial status on
approval—is counterintuitive. This finding, which should be validated in followup research, may reflect a stronger intuition among financially stable individuals
that information about sexual harassment should be public, as long as it pertains
to those of similarly financially stable background.
Second, the interaction term between severity of misconduct and party
affiliation was also statistically significant (β=-0.27; p=0.04, see Table 5 in
Appendix II). Thus, participants’ reaction to the severity of the harassment
incident depended on their party affiliation, such that a shift from a Democrat to
a Republican affiliation further decreased the probability that participants will
approve a secret settlement when the harassment act was severe.135 As discussed
below, this finding may suggest a potential common ground for legislative action
in this area, at least when it comes to severe acts of harassment. However, given
its exploratory nature, further research is needed to substantiate this finding.
Finally, as noted, the survey also asked participants to rate the level of
importance additional items of information about the harassment scenario will
have for their decision to approve or reject the secret settlement. An analysis of
these information items showed that the highest rated items were whether the
wrongdoer has a pattern of sexually harassing his colleagues (Mean=2.99,
133. It should be noted that the analysis was conducted by creating a dummy dichotomous variable (0=states
which did not prohibit/ limit NDAs; 1=states which prohibited/ limited NDAs). This variable did not have a
statistically significant effect on level of approval.
134. That said, it should be noted that the sample was not representative in terms of state of residence, which
should limit any broader inference drawn from this finding.
135. It should be noted that such an interaction effect was not statistically significant when it came to a shift
to an independent affiliation.
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SD=1.23)—with almost half of the participants (47%) rating it “very
important”—and the victim’s likelihood of winning a lawsuit against the
company in court (Mean=2.97, SD=1.08)—with close to forty percent (39.5%)
of participants rating it “very important.”136 Additional highly ranked
information items included whether the victim was represented by a lawyer
(Mean=2.8, SD=1.18), and whether the wrongdoer was terminated from the
company as a result of his behavior (Mean=2.8, SD=1.19).137 In contrast, one of
the lowest rated items was whether the wrongdoer agrees to go to therapy as part
of the settlement agreement (Mean=1.8, SD=1.4).138
VI. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As detailed in the previous Part, the findings show a general tendency
among participants to reject NDAs across the four experimental conditions.
Furthermore, the findings reflect an effect of each of the two independent
variables on NDA endorsement: the severity of misconduct and the victim’s
financial status. Finally, the findings suggest a host of other exploratory effects
which ought to be pursued in future research. In this Part, I discuss these findings
in light of the psychological research surveyed above, as well as the implications
of these findings for regulating NDAs, highlighting directions for future
research.
A key motivation for this study was to begin answering the question: to
what extent, and under what circumstances, does the public want information
about sexual harassment to be kept under wraps? To the extent that
psychological phenomena such as taboo tradeoffs and deliberate ignorance are
instructive in the context of sexual harassment NDAs,139 one might assume that
since uncomfortable tradeoffs—like exchanging money for physical or
emotional injury—are difficult for people to morally stomach, they will prefer
to remain in the dark regarding the existence of such exchanges, even at the cost
of public accountability for sexual misconduct. The findings of this research may
cast doubt on the extent to which these phenomena apply in this context,
showing that participants were generally more inclined to reject a secret
settlement than they were to approve it. This tendency may be a result of lay
people’s taste for accountability or for titillating gossip, and future research

136. A t-test showed that differences between these two variables—mean offender harassment pattern and
mean victim court win—were not statistically significant (p>0.1).
137. T-tests showed that differences between these two variables—mean victim represented by lawyer and
mean offender fired—and mean offender harassment pattern were statistically significant (p=0.02 and p=0.015,
respectively).
138. Difference between this variable and mean offender harassment pattern was statistically significant
(p<0.005).
139. See supra Part III (discussing the various theories which may help explain the psychology of secret
settlements, including taboo tradeoffs and deliberate ignorance).
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should explore these various motivations as potential drivers for attitudes
regarding NDAs.140
That said, in line with the psychological research on jury decision-making
described above, participants tended to endorse a secret settlement for workplace
sexual harassment under certain circumstances. These findings provide insight
into when the public thinks the societal cost of confidentiality is the steepest.141
The findings thus support the theory that lay people may prefer secrecy over
transparency in some cases, and that such tendency depends on at least two
factors: the severity of the harassment incident itself and the victim’s financial
status. Specifically, as noted, both low severity and a financially struggling
victim increased the probability of participants endorsing the secret settlement.
Focusing on these two independent variables, the findings help
conceptualize how the public perceives monetary compensation conferred to
victims of sexual harassment through secret settlements. With regard to a
victim’s financial status, the findings lend support to the phenomenon described
by Van Koppen & Ten Kate as “the underdog factor.”142 While earlier research
identified this phenomenon in jury decision-making, the findings show that in
the context of workplace sexual harassment, lay people tend to sympathize with
poorer would-be-plaintiffs even at the pre-lawsuit stage. This tendency was
manifested in participants’ inclination to approve a secret settlement when it
provided compensation to a victim in financial need, which also aligns with lay
people’s preference, as shown in jury studies, to have the plaintiff receive the
punitive award money rather than donating the award to charity.143 Such
inclination held across severity of misconduct conditions, as well as across
demographic controls such as gender, age, level of education, and party
affiliation. In particular, as noted, household income actually increased the effect
of a victim’s financial status on approving the secret settlement, meaning that
the “underdog effect” was even more pronounced among higher income
participants. This finding also reflects the unwillingness of higher income
participants to accept confidentiality when it comes to financially stable victims,
like themselves.
How should these findings regarding the effect of victims’ financial status
on secret settlement approval inform policymakers considering sexual
harassment sunshine laws?144 The findings highlight the importance lay people
140. Lay people may also have an unrealistic view of what it takes to sue, how much it will cost, how long
it will take, etc. These are all factors that should be pursued in future research as potentially affecting NDA
approval.
141. I borrow Hoffman & Lampmann’s language, arguing that NDAs carry the steepest cost when created
by organizations. See Hoffman & Lampmann, supra note 1, at 168. As detailed below, further research is
required to tease out the driving mechanism behind lay people’s rejection or endorsement of NDAs in this
context.
142. See Van Koppen & Ten Kate supra note 108, at 228–29.
143. See Anderson & MacCoun, supra note 99, at 326.
144. Cf. Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, 129 YALE L.J. 2232, 2237 (2020) (focusing on
commonsense understandings of legal concepts like consent, Sommers argues that these ideas are relevant for
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attribute to the distributive power of settlements;145 that is, the ability of
settlement agreements to provide a measure of closure and justice—in the form
of monetary compensation—to victims of sexual harassment who are struggling
financially. In this sense, the findings indicate that the public is willing to forgo
its right to know about sexual harassment incidents for the benefit of ensuring
compensation to a financially struggling victim. To the extent that
confidentiality bans risk the side effect of limiting the availability of settlement
or reducing its value for employers—thus reducing compensation for
victims146—policymakers and victim advocates should consider ways to
maintain victims’ bargaining power in settlement negotiations and allow them
to bargain for a settlement rather than opt for a court process if that choice is a
better fit for their financial situation.147 Acknowledging the role of silence as a
bargaining chip for victims of sexual harassment should prompt activists and
policymakers to ensure victims do not lose their already diminished power in the
negotiation as a result of blanket confidentiality bans.
Furthermore, putting in place protections that allow victims to negotiate a
settlement would help ensure confidentiality bans do not give rise to a chilling
effect, discouraging victims who do not wish to speak out publicly from
reporting the harassment they experienced.148 Indeed, as the feminist critique on
sunshine laws points out, such laws could become a second imposition on
victims’ autonomy, tasking them with the burden of speaking out to end the
practice of sexual harassment, rather than placing such burden with the
perpetrators.149 This is especially crucial if the #MeToo movement seeks to
promote inclusion and diversity. As Lesley Wexler, Jennifer Robbennolt, and
constructing rules about primary behavior. Here, my focus is on “secondary behavior,” namely how we ought
to think about litigation and settlement and the extent to which litigation, run by professional lawyers, can bend
human psychology in pursuit of optimal arrangements).
145. See Parramore, supra note 31.
146. Moss, supra note 9, at 891–92; see also Zitrin, supra note 9, at 118 (noting that on the other hand,
confidentiality bans might increase the likelihood of parties settling pre-filing).
147. One way to maintain victims’ bargaining power would be through unionizing in industries that are
particularly prone to sexual harassment and negotiating in advance the terms of NDAs. For an analysis of the
relationship between union membership and sexual harassment, and specifically the impact of union resources
for dealing with harassment and union tolerance for harassment on antecedents and consequences of harassment,
see Bulger, supra note 19, 727–28. Another potential path is submitting a class action to achieve more collective
bargaining power. On factors that influence the decision to seek legal relief in the form of class action in response
to sexual harassment, see Wright & Fitzgerald, supra note 19, 266.
148. Women may respond in a variety of different ways to sexual harassment. See Louise F. Fitzgerald,
Suzanne Swan & Karla Fischer, Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications
of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 118–19 (1995) (providing a review of
behavioral science research regarding responses to sexual harassment, including their links to outcomes and
consequences); L. Camille Hébert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual Harassment?,
82 IND. L.J. 711, 712 (2007) (exploring the ways in which women typically respond to sexual harassment—
other than by immediately filing a formal complaint—and providing explanations as to the reasonableness of
their actions).
149. Alabi, supra note 43, at 76 (arguing that such shift is similar to past accusations that attempted to shift
the blame of sexual assault to women based on their perceived flirtatiousness or the manner in which they
dressed).
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Colleen Murphy argue, it is vitally important for the movement to include and
address the interests of marginalized groups within the larger movement to avoid
duplicating injustice.150 The findings of this study, along with the risks pointed
out above, should thus give pause to policymakers contemplating blanket
confidentiality bans and encourage them to come up with safeguards that protect
victims’—especially marginalized victims’—interests in the aftermath of such
laws’ implementation.151
As noted, severity of misconduct also had a statistically significant
negative effect on endorsing a secret settlement, such that low severity increased
the probability of approving the settlement. This finding indicated that lay
people tend to feel more comfortable about concealing an act of sexual
harassment when it comes to more minor acts of harassment, such as directing a
sexual joke at an employee. In such cases, participants may have viewed the
harassment incident as a private matter to be settled by the parties rather than a
matter of public importance and did not feel as strongly about wishing to know
about it. Though the study cannot unequivocally attest to the reasons underlying
this effect, it is possible that participants engaged in a cost-benefit analysis,
comparing the costs which publicly exposing the harassment will have for the
offender,152 the victim,153 or both, to the benefit to society as a result of exposing
a relatively minor harassment act.
Indeed, previous studies have shown that lay people tend to associate more
severe harassment with greater harm to the victim,154 and with more
blameworthiness assigned to the perpetrator.155 Therefore, in the low severity
150. Lesley Wexler, Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Colleen Murphy, #MeToo, Time’s Up, and Theories of
Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 105–06 (2019).
151. It should be noted that the California STAND Act does allow victims to maintain their privacy by
removing their personal information from any public records. See STAND Act, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 953
(West) (codified at CIV. PROC. § 1001). That said, the task of bringing forward a claim still falls on the victim’s
shoulders.
152. As for the offender’s reputational harm, the argument typically focuses on false accusations. See
Levmore & Fagan, supra note 26, at 344 (noting that “[m]andatory transparency, as required by some sunshine
laws, likely goes too far because news of [a plaintiff’s] claim[s] will bring forth claimants who erroneously,
irrationally, or strategically believe [the tortfeasor] injured them”).
153. Unfortunately, society is still critical of sexual harassment victims nearly as much as (if not more than)
it is of perpetrators. Victims often receive negative responses from their surroundings. See, e.g., Courtney E.
Ahrens, Being Silenced: The Impact of Negative Social Reactions on the Disclosure of Rape, 38 AM. J. CMTY.
PSYCH. 263, 263 (2006) (considering the impact of negative reactions from support providers on rape survivors’
willingness to disclose by qualitatively analyzing the narratives of eight rape survivors who initially disclosed
information about their assault but then chose to cease further disclosure for a significant period of time).
However, some progress may have been made as a result of the #MeToo movement raising awareness to the
widespread nature of sexual misconduct. See, e.g., Stephanie E.V. Brown & Jericka S. Battle, Ostracizing
Targets of Workplace Sexual Harassment Before and After the #MeToo Movement, 39 EQUALITY, DIVERSITY &
INCLUSION: INT’L J. 53, 54 (2019) (arguing that the birth of the #MeToo movement lessened the impact of
ostracism—which historically prevented individuals from disclosing workplace abuse—empowering victims to
report their abusers).
154. See, e.g., Cass et al., supra note 103, at 316.
155. See, e.g., Sara Landstrom, Leif A. Stromwall, & Helen Alfredsson, Blame Attributions in Sexual
Crimes: Effects of Belief in a Just World and Victim Behavior, 68 NORDIC PSYCH. 2, 7 (2016) (finding
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conditions, participants may have interpreted the sexual joke as causing little
harm to the victim, which in turn may not justify the time and cost which a court
process entails. Furthermore, previous research in the criminal justice context
has proved that greater severity is often associated with greater moral outrage
generated by the act.156 Therefore, the more severe harassment act—the
wrongdoer exposing his genitalia—may have triggered rejection of a secret
settlement, as in such cases participants felt more morally outraged by the act
and thus cared more about the public interest in knowing about such an incident.
In this sense, this finding deviated from the prediction generated by the taboo
tradeoffs and deliberate ignorance theories, indicating that lay people actually
preferred public disclosure of what might be considered the most uncomfortable
information. A desire for public condemnation and accountability was perhaps
pulling participants in the other direction in the more severe harassment
scenarios. This finding may also reflect the impact that the #MeToo movement
has had in shaping legal attitudes,157 at least when it comes to secret settlements
concealing severe acts of harassment. However, as noted, it may also be the
result of the public’s interest in titillating gossip, which is more pronounced
when it comes to severe acts of harassment.
How might policymakers aspiring to promote sunshine laws put the
findings of this Article to use? First, policymakers struggling to “sell” their
constituents on confidentiality bans may focus on more severe acts of
harassment as an intermediate solution; that is, as a way to limit the impact such
bans will have on employers and organizations, as well as on victims, while still
embodying the public’s right to know where the public actually wants to exercise
it.158 Second, the interesting finding that the effect of severity on endorsement
of a secret settlement was moderated by political affiliation, such that a move
from Democratic to Republican affiliation decreases the probability of
endorsement when the harassment is severe, presents a potential opening for a
bipartisan initiative to eliminate secret settlements that relate to such severe acts
of harassment. The challenges would be, first, to define which acts are
considered severe and which are considered minor and where precisely to draw
the line, and second, to ensure that actors cannot easily game the system by

participants attributed more blame to perpetrator and less blame to victim in the more severe crime scenario—a
sexual assault vs. an online sexual harassment).
156. Cf. Carlsmith & Darley, supra note 17, at 199–200 (discussing the relationship between severity and
moral outrage in the context of criminal behavior and punishment).
157. For a review of a host of legal implications prompted by the movement, including in the context of the
practice of secret settlements, see Tippet, supra note 29, at 235.
158. Of course, a concern would then arise that actors would alter allegations in order to navigate around
the ban. Cf. Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort
Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 8 (2005) (discussing the ways in which actors navigate around insurance
restrictions when it comes to intentional tortious conduct).
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altering allegations.159 It may also be argued that even the so-called minor
incidents can amount to a hostile work environment when there are reoccurring
incidents.160 As noted, Ian Ayers suggested focusing on repeat offenders as a
compromise between blanket confidentiality bans and maintaining the status
quo.161 Further research is needed to determine the effect of reoccurring
harassment incidents on secret settlement approval.
Furthermore, the positive yet relatively weak correlation coefficients found
between approval of a secret settlement and general views on NDAs, acceptance
of sexual harassment myths, and party affiliation indicate that participants were
relatively sensitive to the specifics of the scenario presented in the vignette. This
finding contrasts with the argument that lay views regarding social problems are
shaped mainly by party affiliation.162 It also deviates from studies in the sexual
misconduct context which exhibited the central role of acceptance of rape myths
as a predictor of participants’ responses to fictional scenarios.163 In this sense,
the study shows that legislation in this area has the potential to make a difference
in shaping lay behavior, as long as it considers the public’s moral intuitions.
Finally, the study also provided directions for future research by
highlighting a host of other potential variables which may influence lay approval
of a secret settlement. For instance, the fact that participants viewed the
wrongdoer’s pattern of sexual harassment as a more important information item
than any other item may indicate that the risk of harassment reoccurrence is of
particular concern to lay people. If confirmed by future research, this finding
may lend support to attempts to create a wrongdoer database or information
escrow which will not allow “repeat offenders” to remain under the radar
through secret settlements.164 This finding also suggests a pathway towards
future research to identify the mechanism driving lay intuitions on the approval
of secret settlements, and the extent to which greater blameworthiness is
assigned to repetitive acts or rather a concern about harm to the social fabric.
159. A starting point could be relying on the research used in this Article which created a scale of harassment
severity. See Terpstra & Baker, supra note 103. Their ranking was later used with a non-student population by
Baker et al., supra note 103. As for gaming, see Baker et al., id., for some initial thoughts.
160. For more on the relationship between harassment severity and judgments in hostile work environment
sexual harassment cases, see Cass et al., supra note 103, at 316.
161. See Ayres, supra note 26, at 84–85 (suggesting using an “information escrow” to be released if another
complaint is brought against the same offender, as a way to target repeat offenders of sexual misconduct).
162. See, e.g., Matthew T. Ballew, Seth A. Rosenthal, Matthew H. Goldberg, Abel Gustafson, John E.
Kotcher, Edward W. Maibach & Anthony Leiserowitz, Beliefs about Others’ Global Warming Beliefs: The Role
of Party Affiliation and Opinion Deviance, 70 J. ENVTL. PSYCH. 1, 1 (2020) (discussing this phenomenon in the
context of climate change but finding compared with partisans who align with the prototypical views of their
ingroup—i.e., political party, opinion-deviant partisans consistently perceive a narrower partisan divide across
views).
163. See e.g., Alder Vrij & Hannah R. Firmin, Beautiful Thus Innocent? The Impact of Defendants’ and
Victims’ Physical Attractiveness and Participants’ Rape Beliefs on Impression Formation in Alleged Rape
Cases, 8 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 245, 246 (2001) (reporting that people who endorse “rape myths”
demonstrated more favorable tendencies toward victims and defendants who were physically attractive in an
alleged rape case scenario).
164. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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Specifically, are lay people interested in seeing the wrongdoer “punished,”
rehabilitating the wrongdoer through therapy, or deterring others from
committing similar acts? These alternative theories, which in many ways mirror
theories of criminal punishment (retaliation, rehabilitation, and deterrence,
respectively),165 in turn trigger alternative ways to design provisions in secret
settlements. The high importance rating this study’s participants placed on
whether the wrongdoer was fired from the company following his misconduct,
and the relatively low importance rating they gave to whether the wrongdoer
agreed to go to therapy, may help shape hypotheses towards such future
research.166
Of course, we need to take into account the limitations of this study. First,
while the survey experiment was administered to a nationally representative
sample in terms of race, gender, and age, the sample was not representative in
other respects, including party affiliation and state of residence. It is also subject
to the general limitations of survey experiments, particularly those conducted
online, in terms of external validity and thus needs to be replicated to ensure the
robustness of the results. While much more research remains to be conducted,
this Article was the first to embark on this path and to lay the groundwork for
following studies.
CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
NDAs are increasingly common in the modern workplace. New data show
that over one-third of the U.S. workforce is bound by an NDA.167 But NDAs are
also known for their role in the current wave of revelations surfacing years of
sexual harassment in a variety of industries. The #MeToo movement exposed
the dark side of these agreements: their potential use as a tool to silence victims
of sexual wrongdoing who raise their voice against their wrongdoers. Especially
troubling is the concern that by concealing information about wrongdoing,
NDAs serve to protect repeat offenders and put others at risk. As a result of such
concerns, many policymakers have either considered or enacted sunshine laws
aimed at banning NDAs in the context of sexual misconduct claims.
Acknowledging the link between the public’s right to know and what the
public is actually interested in knowing, this Article set out to provide sorely
missed empirical support to such legislation efforts, by identifying
circumstances under which lay people prefer to keep sexual harassment under
wraps. The findings expose the effect of two key variables on such moral
165. See generally Carlsmith & Darley, supra note 17 (discussing the various theories of criminal
punishment and surveying psychological research attempting to assess their respective impact on lay people’s
punitive intuitions).
166. The high importance placed by participants on firing offenders is interesting to contrast with accounts
which discount the value of terminating individual harassers. See Vicki Shultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L. J. F. 22, 25–26 (2018).
167. Orly Lobel, NDAs Are Out of Control. Here’s What Needs to Change., HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 30,
2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-change.
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attitudes: the severity of the wrongdoer’s misconduct and the victim’s financial
status. The findings also demonstrate the importance of party affiliation,
household income, and age in determining attitudes towards NDAs, as well as
the relationship between acceptance of sexual harassment myths and attitudes
towards NDAs. These findings should now inform policymakers contemplating
confidentiality bans. Indeed, policy in this area could have a bigger impact—
both in terms of the number of states adopting sunshine laws and in terms of
these laws’ impact on their audience—if it successfully addresses lay sentiments
as to which secret settlements are the most reprehensible and which might be
more acceptable. Such an approach will minimize attempts to bypass the
legislation, which will decrease its impact. Importantly, to maintain its
momentum and ensure its fairness, the #MeToo movement needs to be sure to
take into account the interests of marginalized victims when advocating for
sunshine laws, which may mean more carefully tailoring sunshine laws to reflect
such victims’ interests.
As noted, this Article is the first of a series of experiments aimed at
empirically examining the psychology of secret settlements. As such, it lays the
groundwork for further studies in this area. The next experiments will test other
variables which might affect lay people’s approval of a secret settlement,
including victim and wrongdoer gender and race, the industry in question, the
potential defendant—an individual or an organization, and various
characteristics of the harassment incident and settlement offered, like the
settlement amount and the victim’s chances of winning in court. Furthermore,
future experiments will vary the settlement clauses to include a sanction imposed
on the wrongdoer or a commitment on the wrongdoer’s part to undergo therapy,
to test the extent to which these play into lay people’s decision of whether to
approve a secret settlement. Finally, future research will further explore the
mechanism driving lay people’s rejection of NDAs attempting to conceal severe
acts of sexual harassment, to assess whether it is rooted in a desire for
accountability, an aspiration to deter others from conducting similar acts, or
other sentiments, such as an interest in titillating gossip. The role of a pattern of
abuse versus an isolated incident in determining attitudes towards NDAs will
also be explored in this context.
Another feature of secret settlements which merits further empirical
attention is the role of lawyers in facilitating or inhibiting such agreements.
While scholars have noted the potential role which lawyers assume in this
context,168 to date there has not been a systematic attempt to evaluate their
perceptions and experiences, and the way these affect the practice of sexual
harassment NDAs.169
168. See, e.g., Dana & Koniak, supra note 50, at 1225; Waldbeser & DeGrave, supra note 52, at 820–26.
169. Cf. Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 275, 276 (2001) (reporting the results of a qualitative study of personal injury lawyers in Connecticut
and discussing the implications of professional norms and practices that govern tort settlement behavior).
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Building such body of research exploring the psychology of NDAs will not
only benefit theory and policy in the context of sexual harassment NDAs.170 It
would also bear implications beyond the realm of sexual misconduct, for other
domains in which NDAs are prevalent and impact social justice, such as police
brutality.

170. For a recent discussion of the implications of NDAs beyond the realm of sexual harassment, see
generally Orly Lobel, Exit, Voice & Innovation: How Human Capital Policy Impacts Equality (& How Inequality
Hurts Growth), 57 HOUS. L. REV. 781 (2020).
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APPENDIX I
Attitude survey questions regarding acceptance of sexual harassment
myths and general views regarding NDAs.
To what extent do you agree/disagree with the following statements?
(answers on a 1–5 Likert scale, from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree)
•
•
•

It is better for society if lawsuits are settled confidentially.
In general, confidential settlement of lawsuits limits the public’s
right to know about important issues (reverse coded)
Women report sexual harassment primarily to receive monetary
compensation.

•

There are more unreported cases of sexual harassment than there are
false complaints (reverse coded).

•

Women who complain about sexual harassment are primarily
interested in holding their offenders to account and protecting others
(reverse coded).

•

False accusations of sexual harassment are a bigger problem than
unreported harassment.
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APPENDIX II
Interaction effect tables.
TABLE 4. INTERACTION EFFECT BETWEEN VICTIM FINANCIAL STATUS AND
HOUSEHOLD INCOME
VARIABLES

Model 1

Victim Financial Status (FS)= 1

0.0714
(0.104)
Household Income = 2
0.170
(0.102)
Household Income = 3
0.303**
(0.0953)
Household Income = 4
0.275**
(0.0993)
1.FS_n#2.Household Income
-0.296*
(0.141)
1.FS_n#3.Household Income
-0.360**
(0.134)
1.FS_n#4.Household Income
-0.301*
(0.144)
Constant
0.310***
(0.0720)
Observations
414
R-squared
0.067
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

TABLE 5: INTERACTION EFFECT BETWEEN SEVERITY OF MISCONDUCT AND
PARTY AFFILIATION
VARIABLES

Model 1

Severity of Misconduct = 1

-0.0482
(0.0662)
0.387***
(0.0828)
0.208*
(0.0840)
-0.275*
(0.131)
-0.167
(0.115)
0.369***
(0.0479)
390
0.077

Party Affiliation = 2 (Republican)
Party Affiliation = 3 (Independent)
1.Severity#2. Party Affiliation
1.Severity#3. Party Affiliation
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

